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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the "right to regulate" as the power of
a sovereign state to adopt and maintain government measures for
public welfare objectives. It explores how claims by foreign
investors in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) may
interfere with the state's ability to regulate, and how the state can
protect its right in international investment agreements. The
Article first explains the structure of modern international
investment law and dispute resolution. It next turns to the right
to regulate and explores why regulatory disputes represent a
major challenge for ISDS. It continues by analyzing how
exceptions, exclusions, and other safeguard provisions can be
used in investment treaties to protect the right to regulate. It then
critically examines the tobacco carve-out and other safeguard
provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement as
to their ability to protect the right to regulate. Finally, the Article
explores alternative solutions to the challenges of ISDS. It
concludes by arguing that regulatory disputes are best resolved
through a hybrid system of dispute resolution that is amenable to
both private interests and public policy considerations.
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comments and suggestions received from participants of the 2016 Research Forum of the
American Society of International Law (ASIL) held at the University of Washington
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in International Dispute Resolution" organized by the Center for the Study of Dispute
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355
VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 356
II. MODERN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION ............................ 365
A. The Network of International
Investment Agreements ....................... 365
B. The Nature and Criticism of the
ISDS Regime ............................... 368
III. REGULATORY DISPUTES IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION ........................................ 373
A. The Right to Regulate in International
Investment Law............................ 373
B. Regulatory Disputes as the Challenge
for ISDS . .......................... ....... 380
IV. RESPONDING TO ISDS CHALLENGES ...................... 384
A. Procedural and Structural Initiatives ........... 384
B. Safeguards to Preserve the Right
to Regulate.. .............................. 387
1. Exceptions ............................. 388
2. Exclusions ............................. 394
3. Non-Precluded Measures .................. 395
C. The TPP Tobacco Carve-Out ................... 398
1. Analyzing the Treaty Provisions ............ 398
2. The Tobacco Carve-Out as Part
of the Global Reform of ISDS ...... ......... 404
D. Seeking Alternative Solutions .................. 406
V. CONCLUSION .................................... 413
I. INTRODUCTION
The reputation of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has
suffered a heavy blow in recent years. Ever since Australia and
Uruguay had to defend their tobacco plain-packaging legislation in
investor-state arbitrations against multinational tobacco company
Philip Morris International, Inc.,' it became clear that foreign
1. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austi., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (UNCITRAL 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cclLGV7-X4X7] (archived
Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Philip Morris Asia]. Although four years after the notice of
arbitration was served, Australia won in this investor-state arbitration, the reputation
of ISDS has been damaged. In large part, because this dispute showed how legitimate
government measures can be challenged in investor-state arbitration through creative
treaty- and forum-shopping. See also Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Uru., ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
356 [VOL. 50:355
2017 THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INVESTOR-STATEARBITRATION
investors can use ISDS to challenge government measures adopted for
legitimate public welfare objectives. Outraged over the dispute with
Philip Morris, the Australian government vowed that it would no
longer include ISDS in its international investment agreements
(IIAs).2 And with Australia present at the negotiating table of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)3 Agreement, the inclusion of ISDS in
the TPP was first called into question. 4 However, by February 2016,
with a new federal government in power, Australia consented to ISDS
and signed the TPP together with eleven other Asia-Pacific nations.5
Yet, outside of the Asia-Pacific Region, the debate about the costs and
benefits of investor-state arbitration continued with renewed vigor as
documents/italaw7417.pdf [https://perma.cclKX3J-TYCC] (archived Jan. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter Philip Morris Brands S&rl] (describing a similar claim against Uruguay).
2. AUSTL. GOV'T, DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT
TRADE POLIcY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 14 (2011),
http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/201 1Gillard%20Govt%20
Trade%20Policy%2OStatement.pdf [https://perma.ccP282-GZF4] (archived Jan. 21,
2017) ("In the past, Australian Governments have sought the inclusion of investor-state
dispute resolution procedures in trade agreements with developing countries at the
behest of Australian businesses. The Gillard Government will discontinue this
practice.").
3. Trans-Pacific Partnership, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://
perma.cc/Z59T-EHFT] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter TPP].
4. The TPP was negotiated behind the closed door, leaving the public largely in
the dark as to the details of negotiation process. In March 2012, Australian Trade
Minister Craig Emerson was quoted as saying that "We do not and will not support
investor-state dispute settlement provisions. This is government policy." See Adam
Gartrell, Labor Standing Firm on Pacific Trade Deal, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au//breaking-news-national/labor-standing-firm-
on-pacific-trade-deal-20120305-lue2b.html [https://perma.cc/E2SR-UFXZ] (archived
Mar. 19, 2017). In spring 2015, the Australian government was still reluctant to agree
on ISDS in the TPP. Noticeably, a draft TPP's investment chapter published by
WikiLeaks in March 2015 contained footnote 29, which excluded application of the ISDS
provisions with respect to Australia and investors from Australia. See Trans-Pacific
Partnership Treaty: Advanced Investment Chapter working document for all 12 nations
(January 20, 2015 draft), WikiLeaks release: March 25, 2015, n. 29,
https://wikileaks.org/tpp-investment/ [https://perma.cc/86K4-YER4] (archived Mar. 6,
2017) ("Section B ["Investor-State Dispute Settlement"] does not apply to Australia or
an investor of Australia. Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement, Australia
does not consent to the submission of a claim to arbitration under this Section.").
5. The TPP was signed on February 4, 2016 by Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and
Vietnam. The future of the TPP is currently unclear as the United States under the new
administration has begun withdrawing from the TPP. See Peter Baker, Trump Abandons
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama's Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html
[https://perma.cc/A7XU-23E8] (archived Mar. 6, 2017). It remains to be seen whether the
TPP will survive the United States' withdrawal.
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part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)6
negotiations. This time ISDS threatened to undermine the treaty as a
whole, as partners across the Atlantic are sharply divided on the merits
of the ISDS regime.7
The critics of ISDS have long pointed to the lack of transparency,
consistency, and overall legitimacy in the ISDS process, where private
arbitrators are called upon to decide multi-million dollar claims
against sovereign states. The opponents of investment treaty
arbitration further allege that, through ISDS, foreign investors-most
commonly multinational corporations-interfere with a government's
ability to regulate in the public interest.8 This includes protection of
public health, public policy, safety, and the environment. The crusade
against ISDS is now supported by evidence from recent investor-state
arbitrations challenging government regulation, notably, in the
nuclear energy sector in Germany, as part of the nuclear power phase-
out program,9 and in the renewable energy sector in Bulgaria, the
6. EU Negotiating Texts in TTIP, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (July 14, 2016)
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 [https://perma.cc/37HG-EPEK]
(archived Jan. 21, 2017) [hereinafter TTIP].
7. See, e.g., ISDS: Important Questions and Answers, TRADEWINDS (Mar. 26,
2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2015/march/isds-
important-questions-and-answers-0 [https://perma.cc/K9QV-7E7Z] (archived Jan. 20,
2017) (discussing the U.S. position (from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) on
ISDS, approving the current system of investor-state arbitration); see also Cecilia
Malmstr6m, Proposing an Investment Court System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 16,
2015), http://ec.europa.eulcommission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-
investment-court-system-en [https://perma.cc/4CMW-RLPF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017)
(discussing the EU position expressing dissatisfaction with modern ISDS and suggesting
to replace it with an investment court system); Krista Hughes & Philip Blenkinsop, U.S.
Wary of EU Proposal for Investment Court in Trade Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2015, 3:00
PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-ttip-idUSKCNOSN2LH20151029
[https://perma.cclV9TS-T8AP] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) (noting the U.S. reaction to the
EU proposal).
8. See OECD, "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in
International Investment Law 2 (OECD Working Papers on Int'l nv., Paper No. 2004/04,
2004) ("[Tihere is increasing concern that concepts such as indirect expropriation may
be applicable to regulatory measures aimed at protecting the environment, health and
other welfare interests of society.").
9. See, e.g., Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Ger., ICSID Case
No. ARB/12/12, http://www.italaw.com/cases/1654 [https://perma.cc/29UQ-YDAV]
(archived Feb. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Vattenfall] (a pending investor-state arbitration
under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the ICSID Convention and Arbitration
Rules, where Vattenfall, state-owned Swedish energy company, is reportedly seeking
compensation for its investments lost due to the shutdown by Germany of two reactors
in Krtimmel and Brunsbittel, in line with the country's energy phase-out plan). See also
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Martin Dietrich Brauch, The State of Play in
Vattenfall v. Germany II: Leaving the German Public in the Dark, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2014), http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-
play-vattenfall-vs-germany-II-leaving-german-public-dark-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
84VY-PBZ3] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) (providing background information on the case).
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Czech Republic, Italy, and Spain as a response to regulatory changes
in their solar energy incentive programs.' 0
The supporters of ISDS defend the system by arguing that the
ability to submit a claim directly to investor-state arbitration under an
investment treaty remains an important factor for private investors
seeking to invest abroad." And so, while the debate on the future of
investor-state arbitration continues, it is clear that, for ISDS to
survive, it has to respond to the most vocal objections regarding the
lack of transparency, legitimacy, public accountability, and consistency
in investment arbitration awards.
Regulatory disputes bring an additional layer to the discussion of
the long-overdue reform of ISDS. Disputes of this type involve
challenges by foreign investors to government measures of general
application, such as laws, regulations, or executive acts.' 2 Regulatory
disputes are particularly controversial because they allow foreign
10. See, e.g., ENERGO-PRO a.s. v. Republic of BuIg., ICSID Case No. ARB/15/19,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/630 [https://perma.cc/VR38-N5JT]
(archived Jan. 19, 2017); EVN AG v. Republic of BuIg., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/17,
http://www.italaw.com/cases/2171 [https://perma.cclKF9R-7TYE] (archived Jan. 21,
2017); Antaris Solar GmbH v. Czech, PCA Case No. 2014-01 (UNCITRAL 2013),
https://pcacases.com/web/view/24 [https://perma.cc/FCD6-FVSZ] (archived Jan. 21,
2017); Belenergia S.A. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/40,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/103?partyRole=2 [https://
perma.cclGZ6P-JZCY] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (one of the six solar energy ICSID
arbitration cases pending against Italy at the time of publication); Cordoba Beheer B.V.
v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/27, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Detais/
731 [https://perma.cc/FA3X-RZFF (archived Jan. 21, 2017) (the latest of over 30 ICSID
arbitrations commenced against Spain in the renewable energy sector); Luke Eric
Peterson, Solar Investors File Arbitration against Czech Republic; Intra-EU BITs and
Energy Charter Treaty at Center of Dispute, INV. ARB. REP. (May 15, 2013),
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/solar-investors-file-arbitration-against-czech-republic-
intra-eu-bits-and-energy-charter-treaty-at-center-of-disputel [https://perma.cclK732-
9MHQ] (archived Feb. 11, 2017) (describing arbitration filed against the Czech Republic
by claimants objecting to the country's recent treatment of investments in photovoltaic
energy production); see Charles A. Patrizia et al., Investment Disputes Involving the
Renewable Energy Industry Under the Energy Charter Treaty, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 2,
2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1036076/investment-disputes-
involving-the-renewable-energy-industry-under-the-energy-charter-treaty
[https://perma.cc/3PWB-N27A) (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (providing an overview of
regulatory changes in the renewable energy sector in these countries and the resultant
investor-state arbitrations).
11. Ted Bromund, James M. Roberts & Riddhi Dasgupta, The Proposed Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Mechanism: U.S. Should Oppose EU Demand to
Abandon It, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2017, 5:40 PM),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/07/the-proposed-investor-state-dispute-
settlement-isds-mechanism-us-should-oppose-eu-demand-to-abandon-it
[https://perma.cc/U3JD-6J4M (archived Feb. 1, 2017).
12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY art. 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (last visited
Jan. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/89YJ-VM7P] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (providing that a
'"measure' includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice")
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT].
359
VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
investors to challenge legitimate government measures in front of
international arbitral tribunals.1 3 The concern is that international
investment agreements and the ISDS regime have empowered foreign
corporations to interfere with a state's ability to regulate for the benefit
of the public at large.1 4 In doing so, they have also placed the defending
state at the mercy of private arbitral tribunals that are often too far
removed from such states to properly consider the public policy
implications of the challenged government measure.16 Furthermore,
regulatory disputes may have a chilling effect on regulation worldwide,
as the fear of ISDS may prompt governments to refrain from adopting
a regulatory measure.16 This growing dissatisfaction with ISDS has led
some countries to cancel or revise their bilateral investment treaties
13. See, e.g., Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration
as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 121, 124 (2006) ("This
growth [of investment treaty arbitration] suggests that multinational enterprises are
increasingly prepared to use investment arbitration to resolve disputes with states,
indicating that investment arbitration has become an important method for foreign
investors to resist state regulation and seek compensation for the costs that flow from
the exercise of public authority.").
14. See, e.g., TPP 'Worst Trade Deal Ever," Says Nobel-Winning Economist Joseph
Stiglitz, CBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/newsfbusiness/joseph-stiglitz-
tpp-1.3515452 [https://perma.cclVKW6-GP5Q] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
'Worst Trade Deal Ever'] ("Stiglitz takes issue with the TPP's investment-protection
provisions, which he says could interfere with the ability of governments to regulate
business or to move toward a low-carbon economy."). See also Van Harten & Loughlin,
supra note 13, at 130 (observing that "a wide range of regulatory disputes between
investors and the state has become subject to control through international arbitration
at the instance of investors").
15. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 126 ("A key aspect of the
investment treaty arbitration is that it transplants this private adjudicative model from
the commercial sphere into the realm of government, thereby giving privately-contracted
arbitrators the authority to make what are in essence governmental decisions.").
16. Concerns over the chilling effect are frequently raised in scholarly and public
policy debates on ISDS. See, e.g., Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of
Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW
AND ARBITRATION 606, 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (arguing that the
issue of regulatory chill has been "inadequately addressed and often prematurely
dismissed by legal scholars"). Indeed, the Uruguayan government was reportedly
considering whether to relax its tobacco control measures to prevent an impending claim
by Philip Morris. See Alison Ross, Uruguay Urged to Fight on in Cigarette Claim, GLOBAL
ARB. REV. (Aug. 13, 2010), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1029513/uruguay-
urged-to-fight-on-in-cigarette-claim [https://perma.cc/4HYV-X2A7] (archived Mar. 6,
2017) (noting that in the summer of 2010 "Uruguayan ministers indicated the
government may be prepared to reverse some of the legislation to stave off a potentially
costly claim [by Philip Morris].") However, there are no persuasive empirical data
showing that investor-state arbitrations have a chilling effect on regulation. See
Christine C6t6, A Chilling Effect? The Impact of International Investment Agreements
on National Regulatory Autonomy in the Areas of Health, Safety and the Environment
2014 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics),
etheses.1se.ac.uk/897/8/CoteAChilling_%20Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAC5-ADEC]
(archived Jan. 21, 2017) (concluding that empirical data do not support the hypothesis
of regulatory chill).
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(BITs);" Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela even went so far as to
denounce the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States1 8 that established the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Responding to these concerns, governments and the international
legal community introduced several procedural and structural changes
to ISDS. In the last five years, through the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), they developed the Rules on
Transparency," amended the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 20 and
adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency 2 1-all for
treaty-based investor-state arbitration. In their HAs, states also began
17. See, e.g., Natasha Mellersh, No Longer a Fair Game?, APR. L. & Bus. (Sept. 30,
2015), https://www.africanlawbusiness.comlnews/5864-no-longer-a-fair-game [https:
//perma.cclVL5Z-LP6A] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (observing that South Africa, for
example, has terminated BITs with several EU countries, including Belgium, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom); see also Ben
Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral Investment
Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/3755clb2-b4e2-11e3-
af92-00144feabdcO [https:/perma.cclA9GU-6NCS] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (noting
Indonesia seeks to cancel or renegotiate its more than 60 BITs); Marta Waldoch & Maciej
Onoszko, Poland Plans to Cancel Bilateral Investment Treaties with EU, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.cominews/articles/2016-02-25/poland-seeks-to-
end-bilateral-investment-deals-with-eu-members [https://perma.cc/23BA-HNPM]
(archived Jan. 20, 2017) (explaining Poland has stated that it considers terminating its
intra-EU BITs); Luke Eric Peterson, Italy Follows Russia in Withdrawing from Energy
Charter Treaty, but for Surprising Reason, INv. ARB. REP. (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/italy-follows-russia-in-withdrawing-from-energy-
charter-treaty-but-for-surprising-reason/ [https://perma.cc/C4JU-J9S3] (archived Feb. 1,
2017) (noting that in January 2015 Italy announced its withdrawal from a multilateral
agreement-the ECT).
18. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (the Washington Convention), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela's Withdrawal from ICSID:
What it Does and Does Not Achieve, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 13, 2012),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-
and-does-not-achieve/ [https://perma.cc/7NLA-JDBF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
19. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration, U.N. Doc. AIRES/68/109 (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglish/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
Transparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KHH-YXVB] (archived Jan. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency].
20. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22, art. 1(4) (Jan. 10,
2011), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-
revised-2010-e.pdf [https:/perma.cc/8ZQQ-V27C] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) ( "[F]or
investor-State arbitration initiated pursuant to a treaty providing for the protection of
investments or investors, these Rules include the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration ... subject to article 1 of the Rules on
Transparency.").
21. See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration, opened for signature Mar. 17, 2015, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HK2M-KHY4] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Mauritius
Convention on Transparency].
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incorporating provisions regarding arbitrators' qualifications and
experience, 22 ethics rules,2 3 and codes of conduct for arbitrators.24 On
a broader scale, to address the apparent legitimacy crisis in investment
treaty arbitration, 25 the European Commission took the lead in
proposing structural changes to ISDS. Most radically, it now proposes
to replace ISDS with a permanent two-tier system of international
investment courts. 26 The free trade agreements (FTAs) of the
European Union with Canada 27 and Vietnam2 8 are the first examples
of treaties that contain provisions for such an investment court system
instead of traditional ISDS.
In addition, to protect their regulatory space and limit exposure to
regulatory disputes in ISDS, states have turned to more careful treaty
drafting. First, they seek to limit potential ISDS claims by revoking or
clarifying the scope of investor protection obligations under IAs.
Second, they seek to secure for themselves in the IIA regime the
22. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, China-Austl., art. 9.15, 1 8, June 17, 2015,
http://dfat.gov.aultrade/agreements/chaftalofficial-documents/Documents/chafta-
chapter-9-investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHC5-6XNE] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) ("All
arbitrators appointed pursuant to this Section shall have expertise or experience in
public international law, international trade or international investment rules, or the
resolution of disputes arising under international trade or international investment
agreements.") [hereinafter ChAFTA].
23. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, EU-Viet., ch. 8, ch. 2, §3, art. 14 (Agreed text
as of Jan. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc
154210.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6JF-PAEC] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) [hereinafter EU-
Vietnam FTA].
24. See, e.g., ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9, Annex 9-A (containing a code of
conduct for arbitrators appointed pursuant to the investment chapter of ChAFTA). See
also Free Trade Agreement, EU-Sing., Annex 9-F (Agreed text as of Feb. 2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2015/june/tradoc_153580.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E9BY-Z9AM] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (providing a Code of Conduct for Arbitrators and
Mediators) [hereinafter EUSFTA].
25. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1521, 1568 (2005) (suggesting that contradictory awards in ISDS undermine "the
legitimacy of investment arbitration, particularly where public international law rights
are at stake and the legitimate expectations of investors and Sovereigns are
mismanaged").
26. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Commission Proposes New Investment Court
System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm [https://perma.cc/YY4P-M4EH]
(archived Feb. 1, 2017); see also Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, EU Finalises Proposal for
Investment Protection and Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-6059_en.htm [https://perma.cc/9U6L-MXKY]
(archived Feb. 11, 2017); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in
Services, Investment and E-Commerce, Ch. II, http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/
2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4V9-PPL5] (archived Jan. 20,
2017) (for text of the EU's Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of
Investment Disputes).
27. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, arts. 8.27-.28
(Final text, Feb. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc-
154329.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NXY-Q5PH] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) [hereinafter CETA].
28. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, arts. 12-13.
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regulatory space for domestic policymaking. To do so, state parties
increasingly incorporate into the treaty text a reference to the right to
regulate as a rationale for various exceptions and exclusions, non-
precluded measures, and deviations from investor protection
obligations. In ISDS, these provisions give an arbitral tribunal a legal
avenue to consider and weigh a state's regulatory interests against the
rights of foreign investors. And third, sovereign states continue to look
for new ways to limit the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals over
regulatory disputes. The tobacco carve-out of the TPP 29 provides the
most innovative solution to the jurisdictional puzzle yet. This unique
provision-a breakthrough by some accounts3 0-gives a state party to
the TPP the option to revoke the benefits of ISDS with respect to claims
challenging a state's tobacco control measures.
But can the tobacco carve-out strike the long-sought balance
between the state's regulatory interests and investor protection rights,
ensuring that a state can freely regulate? It is highly unlikely. The
tobacco carve-out on its own does not reserve for the state the right to
regulate the production, marketing, use, or consumption of tobacco. It
only seeks to ensure that a state can avoid ISDS on a case-by-case basis
with respect to claims challenging its tobacco control measures.
Consequently, the tobacco carve-out does not remove substantive
investor protection obligations, but simply eliminates one of the forums
for investment treaty claims. To ensure that a state can freely regulate
in view of its investor protection obligations, an alternative solution is
needed.
At the heart of the regulatory disputes problem is the tension
between the public and private interests and the question of setting
priorities between the rights of sovereign states and those of foreign
investors. The borderline between these priorities has shifted over the
years. At the birth of trade liberalization and investment agreements
in the second half of the twentieth century, governments were willing
to compromise on their sovereignty in hopes of promoting trade,
attracting foreign investments, and driving economic development.
Once their economic and development priorities changed, however,
states began revising and rebalancing their investor protection
regimes. In addition, countries like China-a predominantly capital
importer in the earlier days of IIAs, but a growing capital exporter
today-sought to balance their newly found interests as capital
exporters with their desire to retain sovereignty and the power to
regulate as the host state.
Along the way, governments and public interest groups have
begun seeing investment treaty tribunals as protectors of the private
29. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5.
30. See, e.g., Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, A Breakthrough with the TPP: The
Tobacco Carve-Out, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 327 (2016).
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interests of foreign corporations. Composed of foreign individuals, far
removed from the realities of the host state they are called upon to
judge, arbitrators are no longer trusted with the public policy decisions.
Understandably, scholars have also expressed concerns over the
"privatization" of international law.3 ' In a pendulum movement, there
is today is a massive push for the "nationalization" of ISDS, which,
from a procedural point of view, remains largely a private dispute
resolution method.
The most evident effort to convert ISDS into a public dispute
resolution method is the call to replace ISDS with a system of
international investment courts. 32 Similarly, countries that have
terminated their BITs or exited the ICSID Convention3 3 have urged
foreign investors to bring any investment claims to their domestic
courts. 34 Further, various transparency initiatives have also been
implemented in the name of the public interest, making the general
public not only aware of a dispute, but also directly involved in the
proceeding through amicus curiae submissions.35 The logic behind
these efforts is to move away from private dispute resolution back to
public dispute resolution since only public judicial bodies are now
perceived as able to make public policy determinations. The TPP
tobacco carve-out that deprives arbitral tribunals of the jurisdiction
over tobacco control measures is the latest example of efforts to move
investment treaty claims back into the domain of public dispute
resolution. 36
Against the logic of these efforts, a better way to address concerns
over regulatory disputes is to structure ISDS as a mix of both
systems-an investor-state arbitration under procedural rules of
international commercial arbitration, supplemented by the possibility
of limited court review. After all, the ideal dispute resolution
mechanism will be called upon to decide on hybrid37 disputes-
disputes involving private interests of foreign investors allegedly
harmed by government regulatory measures-and so it is only logical
31. See generally Franck, supra note 25 (warning against looming legitimacy crisis
in investment treaty arbitration due to inconsistent decisions by private arbitral
tribunals affecting public international law and the rights of sovereign states).
32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the European
Commission's proposal to install a permanent international investment court system).
33. ICSID Convention, supra note 18.
34. See, e.g., Cecilia Malmstr6m, Proposing an Investment Court System,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 16, 2015), http://ec.europa.eulcommission/2014-2019/
malmstromlblog/proposing-investment-court-system-en [https://perma.cc/4CMW-
RLPF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
35. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text for various legal instruments
that have been adopted to date to increase transparency in ISDS.
36. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 (containing the TPP tobacco carve-out provision).
37. See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 74 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 151 (2003) (discussing the hybrid origin of investor-
state arbitration).
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to look for a hybrid institutional and procedural solution to the
mechanism of resolving such disputes.
The goal of this Article is twofold. First, the Article explains the
essence of the concerns about regulatory disputes in modern ISDS. In
doing so, it explores the concept of the "right to regulate," which allows
a host state to adopt measures for legitimate public policy objectives
that deviate from the state's investor protection obligations. The
Article also surveys the contours of the right to regulate, as provided
by exceptions, exclusions, carve-outs, and other safeguard provisions
in international investment law. Second, the Article critically
examines the tobacco carve-out and other safeguard provisions in the
TPP and suggests a more appropriate solution for ensuring that a state
can freely regulate, and, should a dispute arise, that a state can resolve
it through ISDS that is amenable to both private interests and public
policy considerations.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of
modern international investment law and dispute resolution, with a
focus on the nature and general criticism of the ISDS regime. Part III
explores the issue of regulatory disputes in investor-state arbitration
by explaining the concept of the "right to regulate" and summarizing
the major criticism of ISDS-that it allows foreign corporations to
challenge legitimate government measures. Part IV first provides
insights into the various structural and procedural changes to ISDS to
date and summarizes how safeguard provisions can be used in IIAs to
reserve the right to regulate. It then critically examines the tobacco
carve-out and related provisions in the TPP and offers alternative
solutions to challenges incident to investor-state arbitration of
regulatory disputes. A short conclusion follows.
II. MODERN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
A. The Network of International Investment Agreements
International investment law encompasses a network of over
thirty-three hundred HAs seeking to attract and promote foreign
investments in state parties.3 8 Having largely emerged as BITs, today
IIAs also include multilateral and bilateral FTAs with investment
chapters, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
38. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016,
INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES xii (2016) [hereinafter WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2016] ("In 2015, 31 new IlAs were concluded, bringing the universe
to 3,304 treaties by year-end . . .. By the end of May 2016, close to 150 economies were
engaged in negotiating at least 57 new IIAs.").
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(NAFTA)3 9 and, more recently, the EU-Canada Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)40 and the China-Australia
Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA)4 1; sector specific agreements, such
as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)42; and now also "mega-regional"
trade and investment agreements, such as the signed TPP and the
proposed TTIP. Modern BITs and investment chapters in FTAs largely
follow the same structure. First, they provide foreign investors with a
combination of investor protection obligations, such as non-
discrimination, fair and equitable treatment (FET), full protection and
security (FPS), and protection against expropriation. Second, for
disputes related to an alleged breach of the above investor protection
obligations, HAs may also provide for ISDS, most commonly, investor-
state arbitration. These two types of provisions are referred to in this
Article as substantive and procedural investor protection obligations,
respectively.
In recent years, the IIA regime has become the subject of criticism
by politicians, lawyers, economists, and civil society groups. They point
out that the role of IIAs in promoting investments, trade, and
development among participating countries remains unclear. Yet the
burden of entering into trade liberalization and investment protection
agreements with ISDS provisions can be significant. For sovereign
governments, such agreements, and the resulting investment disputes,
may impede the ability to regulate and lead to multimillion dollar
damages awards against states.44 For local businesses, there is the
39. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
40. CETA, supra note 27.
41. See ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9.
42. Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S.
95, http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf
[https://perma.ccW7YA-2L99] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) [hereinafter ECT].
43. See, e.g., Ajan Lejour & Maria Salfi, The Regional Impact of Bilateral
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (CPB Netherlands Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis, CPB Discussion Paper 298, Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/the-regional-impact-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-
on-foreign-direct-investment [https://perma.cclPJ2F-QYPQ] (archived Feb. 11, 2017)
(showing that there might be benefits of BITs for lower and middle income countries, but
not to high income countries, although there are observable differences among world
regions).
44. The ability of foreign investors to interfere with the government's ability to
regulate is often discussed as part of the chilling effect argument. In particular, it has
been argued that governments may react to investor-state arbitrations or the threat of
claims by foreign investors by adopting less than optimal level of regulation. For further
discussion, see note 16 and the accompanying text. Damages awarded to foreign
investors in ISDS may range from several million to hundreds of millions of dollars, with
the largest award ever rendered reaching as high as $50 billion. See U.N. CONFERENCE
ON TRADE AND DEv., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN 2015. IIA ISSUES NOTE II 6 (2016) (reporting that in 2015 "[t]en decisions awarded
compensation to the investor, ranging from $8.6 million to $383.6 million. The average
amount awarded was $120.2 million and the median $48.6 million").
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threat of being unable to compete with foreign multinational
corporations and of going out of business. For local communities,
investment projects often entail the arrival of foreign companies that
operate without regard for community values, local customs,
traditions, development needs, and-as failed investment projects
have demonstrated-without having to deal with the disastrous
environmental and health impact.45 Understandably, international
investment treaty making today requires persuading governments and
other stakeholders that the benefits of trade liberalization outweigh its
costs.
The debate on the future of the IIA regime is particularly heated
now because of a new trend in treaty making: the conclusion of
unprecedentedly large trade liberalization treaties-the mega-regional
trade agreements, or the so-called mega-regionals. The TPP46 was
signed by twelve Pacific Rim countries that have a total GDP of about
$28 trillion and a combined population of nearly 817 million (over 37.6
percent of the world's GDP and over 11.1 percent of the world
population as of 2015).47 Together with the United States, it could have
become the largest FTA ever concluded, accounting for more than a
third of the world trade.4 8 The CETA, which was recently approved by
the European Parliament,4 9 would cover economies with a total GDP
of nearly $18 trillion and a combined population of over 545 million as
of 2015 (over 24.1 percent of the world's GDP and over 7.4 percent of
45. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23,
(UNCITRAL 2009), http://www.italaw.com/cases/257 [https://perma.cc/8W68-JRNH]
(archived Jan. 22, 2017) (involving allegations of severe environmental pollution and
health damage resulting from Texaco/Chevron operations in the Amazon region of
Ecuador).
46. TPP, supra note 3.
47. See GDP at Market Prices (current US$), WORLD BANK DATA
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD [https://perma.cc/Q482-4T6F]
(archived Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter GDP, Total] (calculating a total GDP by adding the
2015 GDPs of the twelve countries that signed the TPP, including the United States).
Percentage of the world GDP for the TPP, as well as the CETA and the TTIP mentioned
below, were calculated using the 2015 world GDP of 74.152 trillion U.S. dollars. Id.
Population, Total, WORLD BANK DATA http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.
TOTL [https:l/perma.ccl9XVC-TJ3K] (archived Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Population,
Total] (calculating the population covered by TPP by adding the 2015 populations of the
countries covered by the agreement). Percentage of the world GDP for the TPP, CETA
and the TTIP were calculated using the 2015 world population of 7.347 billion. Id.
48. See Kevin Granville, This Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-
what-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html [https://perma.cc/W5JJ-LNAG] (archived
Jan. 22, 2017). Note, however, that the projected influence of the TPP included the
United States, which since has begun its withdrawal from the treaty.
49. CETA, supra note 27; see In Focus: EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA), EUR. COMM'N, (Jan. 16, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/cetal [https:lperma.ccR6XV-7UB4] (archived
Jan. 17, 2017).
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the world population as of 2015).5o The proposed TTIP 5s between the
United States and the European Union would affect countries with a
total GDP of over $34 trillion and a combined population of 831 million
(over 46.3 percent of the world GDP and 11.3 percent of the world
population as of 2015).52 The importance of these trade liberalization
treaties is hard to understate. It also explains the contentiousness of
the debates in negotiating and drafting modern IIAs, most notably,
with regard to their ISDS provisions.
B. The Nature and Criticism of the ISDS Regime
As an international law instrument, ISDS allows a foreign
investor to bring a claim-commonly in investor-state arbitration-
against the host state for violation of its IIA obligations. States agree
to arbitral jurisdiction by giving consent to investor-state arbitration
in IIAs, in domestic legislation, or in investment contracts. The right
to file a claim in ISDS is rarely conditioned on the exhaustion of local
remedies, such as filing a case in local courts or satisfying other
domestic legal remedies under host state law. In this sense, IIAs
operate like contracts for the benefit of third parties. Although they are
concluded by sovereign states, IIAs provide third-party beneficiaries-
the foreign investors-with the rights that are directly enforceable in
international arbitration against state parties.
Scholars have struggled to advance a single theory of ISDS, often
drawing analogies to contract law, international law, and
constitutional law.53 Most notably, Gus Van Harten and Martin
Loughlin have developed the theory of global administrative law,
arguing that the right to initiate a claim in investor-state arbitration
50. See GDP, Total, supra note 47 (calculating a total GDP of the CETA countries
by adding the 2015 GDPs of Canada and the twenty-eight Member States of the
European Union); Population, Total, supra note 47 (calculating the population covered
by the CETA by adding the 2015 populations of Canada and the European Union).
51. TTIP, supra note 6.
52. See GDP, Total, supra note 47 (calculating a total GDP of the proposed TTIP
by adding the 2015 GDPs of the United States and the twenty-eight Member States of
the European Union); Population, Total, supra note 47 (calculating the population
covered by the TTIP by adding the 2015 populations of the United States and the
European Union).
53. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of
Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353 (2015) (proposing "a new triangular
framework that draws on principles from public international law, third-party
beneficiary doctrines, and public law in a way that captures the unique, hybrid nature
of investment treaties"); Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-State
Regulatory Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT'L L. 295, 295-335 (2015); Van Harten & Loughlin,
supra note 13, at 121 (suggesting an analogy to domestic administrative law is more
fitting than an analogy to international commercial arbitration); Anthea Roberts, Clash
of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J.
INT'L L. 45 (2013) (using various frameworks and analogies to help foster understanding
of the "clash of paradigms" underlying the investment treaty system); Douglas, supra
note 37, at 152-55.
368 [VOL. 50:355
2017] THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN IN VESTOR-STATEARBITRATION
is analogous to judicial review of the state's regulatory acts in domestic
courts. 54 In developing their theory, they first identified four specific
features of investment treaty arbitration, namely, (1) the authorization
in IIAs of individual claims by foreign investors against host states, (2)
the expanded reach of investment arbitration as an "international
mechanism of adjudicative review" through forum shopping facilitated
by IIA, (3) the availability of claims for damages against host states,
and (4) the direct enforcement of awards in domestic courts
worldwide.5 5 They further observed that the cumulative effect of these
features is "to subject the regulatory conduct of states to control
through compulsory international adjudication to an unusual
extent."56 Consequently, they argued that, because of the potential of
this international mechanism to "exert a strong disciplinary influence
over domestic administrative programmes . . . investment arbitration
should be seen to constitute a powerful species of global administrative
law."57
Procedurally, ISDS is, of course, most similar to international
commercial arbitration. In fact, investor protection agreements often
allow a foreign investor to submit its claim to arbitration using the
rules of international commercial arbitration, such as the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.58 Beyond these rules, the parties may arbitrate by
relying on the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules on Procedure
for Arbitration Proceedings or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.59
Over the years, the ISDS regime has been criticized for the
shortcomings of a number of its features. 60 For instance, the ISDS
system is notoriously one-sided in its design. It provides a foreign
investor-but not a host state-with a right to sue and a right to choose
the arbitration mechanism. More specifically, with the exception of
rarely permitted counterclaims, ISDS gives the right to bring a claim
54. See, e.g., Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 121, 140 ("Investment
arbitration is constituted by a sovereign act, as opposed to a private act, of the state and
this . . . . makes investment arbitration more closely analogous to domestic juridical
review of the regulatory conduct of the state."). See generally Benedict Kingsbury et al.,
The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005)
(discussing the factors encouraging and those constraining the development of global
administrative law).
55. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 122.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19 ¶ 4(c) (listing the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules as an alternative under which the claimant may submit a claim).
59. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19 TT 4(a)-(b) (listing the ICSID Convention
and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, as well as the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules, as alternatives under which the claimant may submit a claim).
60. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute
Settlement in EU Agreements, EUR. COMM'N (2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
html/151916.htm [https://perma.ccl9QRY-WYFMI] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (addressing
imperfections of the current system of ISDS in IIAs).
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to foreign investors, but not to the host state.61 The choice of
arbitration rules and procedure is similarly given to foreign investors,
who can select a particular arbitration mechanism from the list of
options available under an investment protection treaty. 62 Moreover,
in HAs, parties give an offer of consent to ISDS with any and all foreign
investors granted protection under a treaty.6 3 Hence, the state does not
know in advance if and when an investment arbitration will be
commenced against it, or which of its investors will choose to perfect
the ISDS consent. Consequently, foreign investors always get the first-
mover advantage in investment dispute resolution.
Despite such imbalance between the rights of foreign investors
and the rights of the host state, governments reportedly win more often
than foreign investors in investor-state arbitrations if wins at the
jurisdictional and the merits phase are combined together." Yet, to
win a case, a host state is required to defend itself in an investor-state
arbitration. This is a very costly endeavor for many states, requiring,
on average, $4.5 million in defense costs in addition to about $373,200
in tribunal costs (if tribunal costs are split equally between parties).6 5
Other shortcomings of ISDS include the lack of transparency and
the absence of an appeals mechanism that would ensure secondary
61. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 1 (defining "claimant" an "an
investor of a Party that is a party to an investment dispute with the other Party"). See
also TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19; CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.23; NAFTA, supra note 39,
art. 1120.
62. 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 9.19 ¶ 4(c); TPP, supra note 3,
art. 9.19 1 4; CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.23 1 2; NAFTA, supra note 39, art. 1120.
63. By their design, IIAs are treaties for the benefit of the third party-foreign
investor. As such, IIAs provide protection under the treaty to all investors and/or
investments that fall within the scope of the treaty.
64. Most recently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) reported that out of total 444 ISDS proceedings concluded by the end of 2015,
about one third was decided in favor of the state and about one quarter-in favor of the
investor. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, supra note 38, at 107. UNCTAD further
reports that about one half of cases that ended in favor of the state were dismissed for
the lack of jurisdiction. Id. Out of the decisions on the merits, states won only 40 per cent
of cases, while 60 per cent of cases were decided in favor of foreign investors. Id.
65. Counting the Cost of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32513/ [https://perma.
cc/D8ZW-ZCWT] (archived Jan. 16, 2017) (describing an Allen & Overy study of 176
investment treaty arbitration cases with data showing that "the average party costs were
quite similar, at US$4,437,000 for claimants and US$4,559,000 for respondents" and
that "the average [tribunal] costs are US$746,000 (median US$590,000), or just over
US$373,200 for each party (split on a 50:50 basis)."). A more recent study of 138 ICSID
arbitrations concluded in the period of July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2015, revealed higher
costs of, on average, $5,619,261.74 for claimants and $4,954,461.27 for respondents, in
addition to $882,668.19 in tribunal costs. See Jeffery P. Commission, How Much Does an
ICSID Arbitration Cost? A Snapshot of the Last Five Years, KLUWERARB. BLOG (Feb. 29,
2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/02/29/how-much-does-an-icsid-arbitration-
cost-a-snapshot-of-the-last-five-years/ [https://perma.ccfFVV4-M9T6] (archived Mar. 19,
2017).
[VOL. 50:355370
2017] THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
review, consistency, and predictability in arbitral awards. 66
Furthermore, ISDS has been criticized for its reliance on private
arbitrators instead of professional judges with training and experience
in international law. 67 Relatedly, investor-state arbitrators are often
suspected of bias and self-interest. 68 Critics of ISDS further attest that,
in borderline cases, private arbitrators have a tendency to establish
jurisdiction in order to hear a case and receive remuneration for their
work.69 Some arbitrators are even accused of always voting for the
state or always voting for the foreign investor, allegedly to secure
future appointments by claimants or defendants.70 These concerns
about the legitimacy of ISDS have become common arguments in the
debate on the future of ISDS.7 1
Additionally, critics of ISDS point out that, through the most-
favored-nation (MFN) clause and corporate reorganizations, the
investment law regime promotes socially wasteful treaty and forum
shopping. 72 Another problem of ISDS is that a challenged regulatory
66. See, e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., REFORM OF INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SE'l'LEMENT: IN SEARCH OF A ROADMAP, 3-4 (June 26, 2013) (listing the lack of
sufficient legitimacy, transparency, and consistency in arbitral decisions among the
main concerns in current ISDS regime).
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership2015/02/25/
ec7705a2-bdle-1 1e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utmterm=.f60d2389166b
[https://perma.cc/XW7S-W2JM] (archived Mar. 6, 2017) ("ISDS could lead to gigantic
fines, but it wouldn't employ independent judges. Instead, highly paid corporate lawyers
would go back and forth between representing corporations one day and sitting in
judgment the next. Maybe that makes sense in an arbitration between two corporations,
but not in cases between corporations and governments. If you're a lawyer looking to
maintain or attract high-paying corporate clients, how likely are you to rule against
those corporations when it's your turn in the judge's seat?").
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., PIA EBERHARDT ET AL., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: How LAW FIRMS,
ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BooM 35
(Helen Burley ed., 2012) (observing that "[a]rbitrators, to a far greater degree than
judges, have a financial and professional stake in the system. They earn handsome
rewards for their services. Unlike judges, there is no flat salary, no cap on financial
remuneration. Arbitrators' fees can range from US $375 to US $700 per hour depending
on where the arbitration takes place. How much an arbitrator earns per case will depend
on the case's length and complexity, but for a US$100 million dispute, arbitrators could
earn on average up to US $350,000." (footnotes omitted)). In addition, in a relatively
small world of arbitrators acting in ISDS, there are reputation concerns that may
motivate arbitrators to perform their functions with a view of securing future
appointments.
70. Daphna Kapeliuk, Collegial Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel Composition
on Outcome in Investment Arbitration, 31 REV. LITIG. 267, 278 (2012).
71. See generally Franck, supra note 25 (discussing solutions to challenges facing
investment treaty arbitration).
72. See, e.g., ROOS VAN OS & ROELINE KNOTTNERUS, DUTCH BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES: A GATEWAY TO'TREATY SHOPPING' FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION
BY MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 31 (2011) (discussing "treaty shopping" and how Dutch
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measure may be covered by several treaties or chapters of the
agreement (e.g., trade and investment chapters), which allows a
foreign investor not only to forum shop for a more preferential treaty
and jurisdiction, but also to use the benefits of several treaties.
Commentators have also criticized ISDS for providing multinational
corporations with the power to sue sovereign governments, interfering
with the state's power to regulate.7 3 And some have expressed general
skepticism about the ability of private arbitrators to address complex
disputes with public policy implications. 74
Dissatisfaction with ISDS is fueled by the fact that it is still
unclear whether HAs contribute to attracting foreign investments to a
country. 75 Thus, the benefits of foreign investment protection regimes
for the economic development of host states remain contentious. This
is a concern because opening up to foreign investors and providing a
consent to ISDS in HAs may lead to costly investor-state arbitrations.
Some countries have therefore chosen to revoke their ISDS consent or
reconsider investment protection regimes. 76 Despite all of this,
however, ISDS continues to play an important role in the
BITs are used by multinational corporations to sue sovereign governments in ISDS); see,
e.g., LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC LAW 11-14 (2015) (explaining that
forum shopping is used to gain access to ISDS).
73. See Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That Lets
Corporations Sue Countries, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid
[https://perma.cc/H8W3-7RBQ] (archived Jan. 16, 2017) (noting that "[t]here was sharp
opposition to this [ISDS] system from its inception, with a bloc of developing countries
warning that it would undermine their sovereignty").
74. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in
a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J.
INT'L L. 283, 336 (2010) ("The inherent problem with ICSID tribunals .... is that they
are not well positioned or equipped to engage in lawmaking, to internalize the context,
and to weigh the policy considerations at play in a particular case .... ICSID arbitrators
are far removed from the polities over whom they exercise control. They often lack
expertise in the particular circumstances and fact patterns of the case." (footnote
omitted)).
75. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397
(2010) (questioning generally whether international investment agreements attract
foreign investments); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., The Impact of
International Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview of
Empirical Studies 1998-2004 (Working Draft 2014) (discussing the impact of IIAs on
foreign investment).
76. A number of sovereign states have cancelled their investment protection
treaties. Examples include South Africa (which has terminated its BITs with Austria,
Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), Indonesia (which to date has terminated 14 of
its BITs), Italy (which announced its withdrawal from the ECT with a notice to the ECT
Secretariat in January 2015). See generally International Investment Agreements
Navigator, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (Jan. 31, 2017),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/7EC8-7RZU] (archived
Feb. 1, 2017).
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interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of international
investment agreements.
III. REGULATORY DISPUTES IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
A. The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law
Of particular concern to the critics of ISDS are the so-called
regulatory disputes. Regulatory disputes are investor-state disputes
that challenge government measures and, as such, may have a chilling
effect on the state's power to regulate. The ability to regulate within
its own borders is a core feature of the sovereign state. Through its
legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies, the state is generally
free to adopt, maintain, and enforce the measures necessary for the
advancement of its public policy goals. Government regulation is thus
understood broadly and may include any act of the legislature, public
administration, or courts that is an exercise of the regulatory or police
power of the state. It is also in the expression of the right to regulate
that a state may enter into international investment treaties and, in
doing so, undertake investor protection obligations.
The words to regulate, regulatory, and regulation are increasingly
common in modern IIAs that seek to reserve for the state the right to
regulate for the public interest. Investor protection treaties
acknowledge a number of legitimate public policy goals, such as the
protection of public health, the environment, competition, human
rights, and social values.7 7
Most commonly, the right to regulate is invoked in IIAs as part of
the general exceptions. General exceptions are treaty provisions that
allow the state to adopt measures that deviate from its investor
protection obligations. Consequently, investment law scholars have
suggested a more narrow definition of the right to regulate that reflects
the specific understanding of such a right under investor protection
treaties. For instance, Aikaterini Titi has defined the right to regulate
in international investment law as "the legal right exceptionally
77. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.16 ("Nothing in this Chapter shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives" (emphasis added)); see also EU-
Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 2, art. 13bis ("1. The Parties reaffirm the right to regulate
within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of
public health, safety, environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or
promotion and protection of cultural diversity. 2. For greater certainty, the provisions of
this section shall not be interpreted as a commitment from a Party that it will not change
the legal and regulatory framework, including in a manner that may negatively affect
the operation of covered investments or the investor's expectations of profits." (emphasis
added)).
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permitting the host state to regulate in derogation of international
commitments it has undertaken by means of an investment agreement
without incurring a duty to compensate."7 8 However, in the public
policy debate over the legitimacy of ISDS, the right to regulate is
generally used in its broadest sense. Most frequently, it is invoked to
express concerns over constraints that investor protection obligations
impose on the state's regulatory power in its domestic policymaking.
Similarly, the concept of public interest is relatively new for HAs.
Scholars have noted that earlier investor protection treaties and other
legal instruments did not contain references to the public interest.79
Instead, these legal instruments employed "narrower categories such
as 'government' or 'consumer' interests, or juxtapose [d] the public
interest and private sector interests, mingling the first order objective
with the second-order trade-offs required to attain it."8 0 The latest
generation of IIAs employ the term public interest generously. For
instance, investor protection treaties allow state parties to expropriate
only for a public purpose.8 ' Furthermore, general exceptions name
public interest as a ground for adopting regulatory measures that
would otherwise be in breach of the HAs provisions. The exceptions do
not define public interest, but frequently list several legitimate
regulatory objectives that allow the state to exercise its right to
regulate despite its investor protection obligations.
In international investment law, the right to regulate manifests
itself in several ways. First, one might see a reference to the right to
regulate in the preamble of international investment treaties.8 2 The
role of such provisions is usually to establish a general regime for
contracting parties and to explain the reasons for entering into a
treaty, but not necessarily to create legal obligations for them. Yet
preamble provisions are frequently invoked by the host state in
international arbitration to support the state's claim that investor
protection obligations are not absolute. Such preamble provisions
reserve for the state the right to regulate for a range of legitimate
78. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 33 (2014).
79. See, e.g., Megan Donaldson & Benedict Kingsbury, Ersatz Normativity or
Public Law in Global Governance: The Hard Case of International Prescriptions for
National Infrastructure Regulation, 14 CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2013) (making such
observation with respect to "formally non-binding but influential instruments issued in
the 2000s by the World Bank, the OECD, and UNCITRAL" regulating national
infrastructure).
80. Id. at 27.
81. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 6.
82. See, e.g., TITI, supra note 78, at 115-22 (discussing the ways international
investment treaties include the right to regulate in the preamble and providing examples
of such references across various treaties).
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objectives, including public health, safety, the environment, corporate
social responsibility, and sustainable development.83
Second, the right to regulate most noticeably comes into play in
the context of disputes over indirect-regulatory or creeping-
expropriation.8 Here, the key issue has long been "to what extent a
government may affect the value of property by regulation, either
general in nature or by specific actions in the context of general
regulations, for a legitimate public purpose without effecting a 'taking'
and having to compensate a foreign owner or investor for this act."8 5
Arbitral tribunals have struggled to establish the exact demarcation
line between indirect expropriation, which, under most HAs, requires
adequate compensation, and regulatory measures that do not reach the
level of expropriation.86 The texts of investor protection treaties often
contain provisions on regulatory expropriation.8 7 By contrast, they
provide little or no guidance to arbitral tribunals in distinguishing such
actions from regulatory measures not subject to compensation. Rare
international legal instruments address the possibility that the state
may regulate without reaching the level of expropriation that requires
compensation."
83. See id. at 116 (listing public policy objectives from which regulatory interests
stem).
84. See generally Katia Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to
Regulate: How to Draw the Line?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 445-77 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010)
(discussing regulation in the instance of expropriation).
85. Id. at 446. See also CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION 452 (2008) ("The signal problem is defining with precision when an exercise
of regulatory or police power crosses the line and becomes compensable, and a vast
literature makes it clear that the line is neither bright not clear." (footnote omitted)).
86. See, e.g., Markus Krajewski, Investment Law and Public Services, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1629, 1637 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015).
87. For instance, the U.S. FTAs with Australia, Chile, Dominican Republic-
Central America, Morocco, Singapore, Peru, and the Model U.S. BIT all contain
provisions on indirect expropriation. See OECD, "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right
to Regulate" in International Investment Law (OECD Working Papers on International
Investment, Paper No. 2004/04 at 6), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321
[https://perma.cc/M2AV-7VZW] (archived Feb. 11, 2017).
88. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 9 ("[e]very natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for
by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."); see also Yannaca-
Small, supra note 84, at 452 (citing to various legal instruments and other texts
recognizing the state's right to regulate through recognition of "a category of
noncompensable takings," including Article 10(5) of the Harvard Draft Convention on
the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, prepared by Harvard
Law School under the direction of Professors Louis B. Sohn and R.R. Baxter. OECD Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property art. 3, Oct. 16, 1967 (describing plan
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Arbitral tribunals rely on several factors in distinguishing
legitimate regulation from regulatory expropriation. In Tecmed v.
Mexico, the tribunal looked at the effect of the regulatory measures and
the degree to which a foreign investor is deprived by regulation of its
property or rights, explaining that
[tihis determination is important because it is one of the main elements to
distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between a
regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state's
police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto
expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real substance.89
Some tribunals have attempted to distinguish between the two
types of regulation by looking at their goals, nature, and the manner
in which they were applied. In doing so, they have relieved the state of
the obligation to provide compensation where regulation had a
legitimate public purpose and was applied in a nondiscriminatory
manner.90 For instance, the arbitral tribunal in Methanex v. United
States held that
Methanex [was] correct that an intentionally discriminatory regulation against
a foreign investor fulfils a key requirement for establishing expropriation. But
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that
the government would refrain from such regulation.91
to deal with taking of property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (defining the limits of expropriation
and regulation).
89. T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 115 (May 29, 2003); see also RUDOLF DOLZER &
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 100 (1995) ("[fIn determining
whether a taking constitutes an 'indirect expropriation' it is particularly important to
examine the effect that such taking may have had on the investor's rights.").
90. Krajewski, supra note 86, at 1638.
91. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules),
Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part VI, Ch. D, 1 7 (Aug. 3,
2005) [hereinafter Methanex]; see also Saluka Inv. BV v. The Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 1 262 (Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Saluka] (stating that a
state is not liable for compensation when expropriation is within its police powers).
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Other tribunals, such as those in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica92 and
Metalclad v. Mexico,9 3 have disagreed that a legitimate public policy
objective on its own can serve as a justification for expropriation
without compensation. Similarly, in Azurix v. Argentina, the tribunal
held that "the issue is not so much whether the measure concerned is
legitimate and serves a public purpose, but whether it is a measure
that, being legitimate and serving a public purpose, should give rise to
a compensation claim." 94
Over the years, arbitral tribunals have showed substantial
deference to the state regulatory power. In doing so, they set a high
threshold for foreign investors seeking to establish indirect
expropriation. 95 Scholars have identified only a few investor-state
arbitrations where indirect expropriation was established. 96 The effect
of the regulation has become the most common criteria for
distinguishing indirect expropriation from legitimate regulation.9 7
92. Compafiia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica,
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶ 71 (Feb. 17, 2000) ("While an expropriation
or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking for a public purpose,
and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was taken for this reason does not
affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking.
That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken
does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation must
be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no
difference." (footnote omitted)).
93. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award, ¶ 111 (Aug. 30, 2000) ("The Tribunal need not decide or consider the motivation
or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree. . . . However, the Tribunal considers
that the implementation of the Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an
act tantamount to expropriation.").
94. Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award,¶ 310 (July 14, 2006) (explaining that a legitimate public welfare purpose of regulation
is not sufficient to allow expropriation without compensation:"[i]n the exercise of their
public policy function, governments take all sorts of measures that may affect the
economic value of investments without such measures giving rise to a need to
compensate. The tribunal in S.D. Myers found the purpose of a regulatory measure a
helpful criterion to distinguish measures for which a State would not be liable: "Parties
[to the Bilateral Treaty] are not liable for economic injury that is the consequence of bona
fide regulation within the accepted police powers of the State. This Tribunal finds the
criterion insufficient and shares the concern expressed by Judge R. Higgins, who
questioned whether the difference between expropriation and regulation based on public
purpose was intellectually viable" (internal citations omitted)).
95. See, e.g., Yannaca-Small, supra note 84, at 476 ("Ultimately, however, the
tribunals have only in a few cases found an indirect expropriation to occur. This results
from the fact that the threshold for characterizing a governmental measure as
expropriation is very high.").
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 455 ("There is a unanimous
agreement that one of the most important factors in determining whether a government
act is an indirect or regulatory expropriation is the effect or the consequences of the
government act on the investor's property. In fact, in some arbitrations, the effect is the
only factor the tribunal has considered." (footnote omitted)).
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With regulatory expropriation consistently proving difficult to
establish, foreign investors then began claiming that host state
regulation breaches the FET standard.9 8
And so, the third way that the right to regulate manifests itself in
international investment law is as part of the FET analysis. The right
to regulate is particularly contentious in this context.99 In contrast to
the expropriation provisions in HAs, the FET obligation usually does
not contain any direct reference to the right to regulate. Consequently,
it is not clear what standards tribunals are expected to follow in order
to ensure that foreign companies are not overstepping in their
demands for investor protection to the detriment of the public interest.
Commentators have also noted that the FET analysis often
necessitates the need to balance the state's right to regulate against
the investor's protection rights.' 0 0 Donaldson and Kingsbury have
argued that such balancing suggests that the competing interests of
the state and of a foreign investor are "of the same order."' 0 One may
question whether this is the correct approach, or, instead, whether the
state's right to regulate for the public benefit should be treated as of a
higher order than the interest of the foreign investors in the state.
Overall, arbitral tribunals have proved willing to give a high level
of deference to the state's own determination of the manner in which it
wishes to exercise its regulatory power. For instance, the tribunal in
S.D. Myers v. Canada famously held that
a breach of Article 1105 [of NAFTA] occurs only when it is shown that an investor
has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises
to the level that is unacceptable from the international perspective. That
determination must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to
regulate matters within their own borders. The determination must also take
98. See, e.g., Yannaca-Small, supra note 84, at 476 (claiming that "recourse to
another protection standard such as the violation of the fair and equitable standard,
which represents a lower threshold, seems to gain ground").
99. See, e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT. UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT II
2 (2012) ("As interpreted by arbitral tribunals, the FET standard raises highly complex
and contentious issues as to the types of administrative and governmental action that
can be reviewed under the standard and the degree of seriousness of breach that is
required to activate a compensable claim.").
100. See, e.g., id. at xiii ("[T]he application of FET provisions has brought to light
the need to balance investment protection with competing policy objectives of the host
State, and in particular, with its right to regulate in the public interest.").
101. Donaldson & Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 27 ("Regardless of the intention, the
prevalence of the references to 'balancing' tends to reinforce a view that the interests of
investors on one hand and users, the state, or the public, on the other, are of the same
order.").
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into account any specific rules of international law that are applicable to the
case.102
More recent tribunal decisions, such as an award in Mesa Power
v. Canada,0 3 followed the same approach, acknowledging a high level
of deference to the state's right to regulate. 104
As part of the FET analysis, the right to regulate may also be
discussed in the context of the legitimate expectations doctrine. 05 For
instance, the tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic referred to the
state's right to regulate as the rationale for the changes in the
regulatory environment, which should be reasonably expected by a
foreign investor. 106 The tribunal held that
[m]oreover, the scope of the Treaty's protection of foreign investment against
unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be determined by foreign
investors' subjective motivations and considerations. Their expectations, in order
for them to be protected, must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness
in light of the circumstances.107
Finally, of particular interest to the analysis here is the fourth
manifestation of the right to regulate: a direct reference to such right
in exceptions, exclusions, and other safeguard provisions in investment
102. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules),
Partial Award, ¶ 263 (Nov. 13, 2000).
103. Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Government of Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules),
PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award (Mar. 24, 2016).
104. Id. ¶ 493 ("[A] finding of a breach of Article 1105 [Minimum Standard of
Treatment] 'must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate
matters within their borders'). Note that citing S.D. Myers v. Canada, the tribunal in
Bilcon v. Canada similarly acknowledged the high threshold of deference to the state's
own determination, but ultimately did not grant such deference to Canada. Clayton et
al. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules), PCA Case No. 2009-04,
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 440, 725 (Mar. 17, 2015).
105. See, e.g., Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12
SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 7, 27-29 (2014) (describing the link between a state's right to
regulate and investors' legitimate expectations).
106. Saluka, supra note 91, ¶ 305 ("No investor may reasonably expect that the
circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged.
In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor's expectations was
justified and reasonable, the host State's legitimate right subsequently to regulate
domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as well. As the
S.D. Myers tribunal has stated, the determination of a breach of the obligation of 'fair
and equitable treatment' by the host State must be made in the light of the high measure
of deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities
to regulate matters within their own borders." (footnote omitted)).
107. Id. ¶ 304. See also Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 332 (Sept. 11, 2007) ("It is each State's undeniable right
and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power. A State has the right to enact,
modify or cancel a law at its own discretion .... As a matter of fact, any businessman or
investor knows that laws will evolve over time. What is prohibited however is for a State
to act unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative power.").
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protection treaties. In these safeguard provisions, the right to regulate
for legitimate public policy objectives may serve as an affirmative
defense to measures otherwise in breach of the treaty provisions. The
right to regulate may also serve as a rationale for carving out
regulatory space from the scope of the application of a treaty. It is this
manifestation of the right to regulate-arguably, the strongest of all-
that was used to introduce the TPP tobacco carve-out, which will be
discussed more in depth in Section IV.C below.
Overall, the right to regulate remains a chameleon concept. It
changes meaning depending on the context of the public policy
discussions and the provision of an investment protection treaty in
which it manifests. And it requires a case-by-case analysis by arbitral
tribunals to distinguish instances of legitimate government regulation
from breaches of investor protection obligations, most commonly in
relation to expropriation and violation of the FET standard.
B. Regulatory Disputes as the Challenge for ISDS
The term regulatory disputes is used loosely by scholars and
commentators to describe investor-state disputes that challenge the
government regulation by the host state as part of the substantive
claims under HAs. Both actions (such as introduction of a new law or
regulation or a reduction in tax breaks 0 8 ) and inactions (such as a
failure to commence an investigation into an allegedly fraudulent
investment scheme) may lead to regulatory disputes.10 9
As a phenomenon, regulatory disputes are not new for investor-
state arbitration. Claims alleging the discriminatory or expropriatory
effect of government regulation with regard to foreign investments or
investors have long been raised in investment arbitration. Early
regulatory disputes-Maffezinino and Methanexx "-involved
environmental regulations. 112 The more recent wave of regulatory
disputes expands beyond allegations of discrimination and
expropriation, however, to claims of alleged violations of FET
provisions.1 1 3 These claims involve an array of government measures,
108. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1, T (where Philip Morris challenged
in investment arbitration the Australian tobacco plain packaging legislation).
109. See, e.g., LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC LAw 2-3 (2015)
(providing a sample of ISDS cases that included challenges to government actions or
inactions).
110. Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13,
2000).
111. Methanex, supra note 91.
112. See Julie A. Maupin, Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes,
in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw: BRIDGING THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 467, 492-93 n.108 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014).
113. See, e.g., Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19,
Award, ¶ 165 (Nov. 25, 2015) ("[The application of the ECT's FET standard allows for a
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ranging from legislative acts seeking to reduce tobacco exposure and
the health risks associated with smoking1 14 to measures providing for
the nuclear power phase-out in order to reduce the health and
environmental risks of nuclear power use. 115 It is this public-benefits
aspect and the regulatory scope of the challenged government
measures that have been identified by legal scholars as distinguishing
recent claims from the earlier generation of regulatory disputes. 116
While earlier cases involved regulation of a limited scope, addressing
a particular industry, territory, or specific foreign investor, the latest
regulatory investor-state arbitrations challenge measures that have a
very remote connection or no connection at all to foreign investors.
Most of these challenges seek damages for the alleged decrease in value
of the investment made or expected, but may also seek specific
performance, such as abolishing a government measure. 117
The ability of private companies-most commonly, multinational
corporations-to bring investor-state arbitration claims to challenge
government measures before international tribunals has generated a
vigorous scholarly and public policy debate and has attracted
substantial media attention.1 1 8 Critics of ISDS are concerned that
balancing exercise by the host State in appropriate circumstances. The host State is not
required to elevate unconditionally the interests of the foreign investor above all other
considerations in every circumstance") [hereinafter Electrabel S.A. v. Hung.]; see also
Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., 1 166 ("[E]ven assuming that Electrabel had an expectation
that it would be awarded the maximum compensation for stranded costs permitted under
EU law, once weighed against Hungary's legitimate right to regulate in the public
interest, such an expectation does not appear reasonable or legitimate." (emphasis
added)).
114. See Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1; see also Philip Morris Brands Sarl, supra
note 1.
115. Vattenfall, supra note 9.
116. See, e.g., RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 500 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015)
(observing that "[c]ontemporary investment arbitrations frequently implicate the scope
of the regulatory powers of the respondent States and reach well beyond the traditional
concerns of simple expropriations and nationalizations. Instead, a much broader variety
of regulatory and public goods disputes has come to be addressed through investment
arbitrations, ranging from the provision of basic public services, such as water and
sanitation, to the maintenance of public order").
117. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case
No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, 1 8.2 (UNCITRAL Nov. 21, 2011) (seeking "an order
for the suspension of enforcement of plain packaging legislation" but note that Philip
Morris later dropped its specific performance request).
118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Trade Agreements Should Not Benefit Industry
Only, Bos. GLOBE (June 23, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/06/23/
warren/CJluXWm4B5VDTdUDsCkwEL/story.html [https://perma.cc/VV87-8XMN]
(archived Jan. 17, 2017) (arguing that "multinational corporations don't have to plead
with the government to enforce their claims. Instead, modern trade deals give
corporations the right to go straight to an arbitration panel when a country passes new
laws or applies existing laws in ways that the corporations believe will cost them money.
Known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), these international arbitration
panels can force countries to pony up billions of dollars in compensation. And these
381
VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
international investment law has empowered foreign corporations to
interfere with a state's ability to regulate in the public interest. Some
of them argue that foreign corporations are thus encroaching on the
state's sovereignty, as the right to regulate is seen by many as the core
feature of the sovereign state.119 From the state sovereignty
perspective, the issue of regulatory disputes appears especially
problematic, as ISDS allows foreign corporations to interfere with the
host government's ability to regulate, constraining the state's capacity
to function for the benefit of the public. 120
Some scholars have further argued that, through ISDS,
corporations have not only acquired the right to directly "sue"
sovereign states before investment tribunals, but have also received
the right to participate in international lawmaking. 121 These
developments have made Jos6 Alvarez look into whether corporations
have become the subjects of international law.1 22
Other scholars have expressed their concern over the institutional
mechanism of investor-state arbitration, which places the responding
state at the mercy of a private arbitral tribunal, often too far removed
from the host state to properly consider public policy implications of
the state's government measures.1 2 3 Along these lines, William Burke-
White and Andreas von Staden have argued that
awards stick: No matter how crazy or outrageous the decision, no appeals are permitted.
Once the arbitration panel rules, taxpayers must pay"). See also "Worst Trade Deal
Ever", supra note 14 (noting economist's impression that particular trade deals benefit
corporations rather than aid the public's interest); Provost & Kennard, supra note 73
(describing recent cases that illustrate international investment tribunal's preferential
treatment of corporations).
119. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 147 ("Investment arbitration
tribunals apply standards that constrain sovereign acts of a state's legislature, judiciary
and administration .... [Bly obliging states to arbitrate disputes arising from sovereign
acts, investment treaties establish investment arbitration as a mechanism to control the
exercise of public authority. For this reason, in particular, investment arbitration is best
analogized to domestic administrative law.").
120. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?
Developing the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
193 (2001).
121. See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects"of International Law?, 9
SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (2011) (noting that "[in investor-state arbitration,]
states have in effect delegated the making of international investment law to third party
private attorneys general, namely the wealthy multinationals that can afford to bring
the cases and generate the case law.") (footnote omitted)). See also Julian Arato,
Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARv. INT'L L.J. 229, 231 (2015) (arguing that, with the
help of ISDS, corporations "have developed the capacity to negotiate with states to create
norms of international law-norms that bear a particular kind of relationship of priority
to the state party's domestic legal order.").
122. See Alvarez, supra note 121, at 12 (explaining how it can be "easy to conclude,
based on the international investment regime, that corporations and other investors
under BITs and FTAs are international legal persons or subjects of international law"
(footnote omitted)).
123. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 74, at 336.
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[t]he inherent problem with ICSID tribunals ... is that they are not well
positioned or equipped to engage in lawmaking, to internalize the context, and
to weigh the policy considerations at play in a particular case. .. . ICSID
arbitrators are far removed from the polities over whom they exercise control. 124
Some have criticized international investment law for allowing
extensive treaty and forum shopping, which add to the social cost of
international dispute resolution and often lead to unfair results in
ISDS. In particular, MFN provisions and various loopholes in investor
protection treaties allow a foreign corporation to reorganize and
establish in a jurisdiction with a more beneficial investor protection
regime. 125 Furthermore, in addition to ISDS, a multinational
corporation and its shareholders may challenge the same government
measure in other forums, such as domestic courts and-with the
assistance of other governments-through the World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism.126 This may lead
to overlapping and related claims-taking two bites of the same apple,
as the saying goes-with conflicting results by various dispute
resolution bodies, double recovery, and enormous costs for a defending
state.127
Furthermore, commentators are particularly concerned that
investor-state arbitrations that challenge government measures may
lead to a "regulatory chill," which is broadly defined as less-than-
optimal regulation that would be introduced by the governments
because of fear of investor-state claims by foreign investors. 128 To date,
there are no data demonstrating that governments across the world
indeed react to ongoing or completed investor-state arbitrations by
refusing to regulate where they think their measures may be
challenged in ISDS. Yet, the proponents of investor-state arbitration
continue to present arguments to rebut the unsupported allegations
that ISDS may have a chilling effect on the right to regulate. 12 9
124. Id. (footnote omitted).
125. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1, ¶ 584 (explaining that Philip Morris
restructured its operation to make use of the BIT between Australia and Hong Kong:
"[flrom all the evidence on file, the Tribunal can only conclude that the main and
determinative, if not sole, reason for the restructuring was the intention to bring a claim
under the Treaty, using an entity from Hong Kong").
126. Take, for instance, the Philip Morris' dispute with Australia, where the
claimant sought to challenge the Australian tobacco plain packaging legislation in three
different fora-domestic courts in Australia, an investor-state arbitration pursuant to
the Australia-Hong Kong BIT, and at the WTO. See Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1.
127. See David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims: Analysis
of Treaty Practice 10 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Paper
No. 2014/03, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxvk6shpvs4-en [https://perma.cc/
C6CT-SPZV] (archived Feb. 2. 2017).
128. See, e.g., Tienhaara, supra note 16. See also C6td, supra note 16.
129. See, e.g., Nikos Lavranos, After Philipp Morris II: The "Regulatory Chill"
Argument Failed - Yet Again, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2016), http://kluwer
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IV. RESPONDING TO ISDS CHALLENGES
A. Procedural and Structural Initiatives
Responding to the most pressing challenges of ISDS, the
international community has already proposed and brought to life
various measures seeking to improve the ISDS regime. To address the
lack of transparency, states and other stakeholders have developed and
made available for use the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 3 0 and
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency' 3 1 . State parties also
increasingly incorporate transparency provisions into their BITs and
into the investment chapters of their FTAs.1 32 These provisions seek to
make the ISDS process more open and accessible to the public through
various disclosure obligations and publication requirements. 3 3 They
also allow non-disputing parties and civil society groups to get involved
and express their opinion on a dispute by making third-party
submissions. 134 There are also revived efforts to increase the
accountability of arbitrators by introducing codes of conduct and ethics
rules into investment treaties.1 35
Beyond these efforts, some countries seek to bring structural
changes to the ISDS regime. The most far-reaching proposal in this
respect has been put forward by the European Union, which, since the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, has competence on foreign direct
arbitrationblog.com/2016/08/18/after-philipp-morris-ii-the-regulatory-chill-argument-failed-
yet-again/ [https://perma.ce/C4LT-CT97] (archived Feb. 2, 2017).
130. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 19, art. 5(1) (discussing that
unless otherwise agreed by the treaty or disputing parties, the rules apply to investor-
state arbitrations initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to resolve disputes
arising out of IIAs concluded on or after April 1, 2014. The Rules provide for various
disclosure obligations-most importantly, publication requirement-which make treaty-
based investor-state arbitrations more transparent and accessible for the public).
131. Mauritius Convention on Transparency, supra note 21. This Convention,
which is yet to enter into force, allows state parties to express their willingness to obey
by the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency with respect to investor-state arbitrations
initiated pursuant to IIAs concluded prior to April 1, 2014.
132. See, e.g., ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.17 (addressing transparency of arbitral
proceedings). See also EUSFTA, supra note 24, art. 9.22 and annex 9-G.
133. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 19, arts. 2-3, 6 (providing
for a number of transparency-related obligations, such as an obligation to provide
information on the investor-state arbitration to the designated repository to publish
such information at the commencement of arbitral proceedings, to publish and make
available to the public documents on investor-state arbitration, and to make hearings
accessible to the public).
134. See id. arts. 4-5. Note that transparency is crucial to allow non-disputing
parties and civil society groups to prepare third parties submissions. Submissions from
non-disputing state parties are particularly relevant in this respect as they allow
acquiring information on the content and meaning of the treaty text from the other state-
party to the BIT (or, in case of multilateral treaty, other state-parties to the treaty).
135. See ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9, annex 9-A (containing a code of conduct for
arbitrators appointed pursuant to the investment chapter of ChAFTA); see also
EUSFTA, supra note 24, annex 9-F.
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investment. 136 As a result, the European Commission now negotiates
comprehensive trade and investment treaties on behalf of the EU
Member States, as opposed to the prior practice of individual Member
States entering into BITs on their own.137 In the context of the TTIP
negotiations with the United States, the Commission proposed to
replace ISDS with a system of permanent international investment
courts that would function similarly to WTO dispute resolution. 138 The
European Union1 39 has already implemented its new approach to
investment dispute resolution in its recent FTAs with Vietnam1 40 and
Canada, 14 1 where it introduced a two-tier investment tribunal system
instead of traditional ISDS.
Both FTAs provide for a permanent tribunal and appellate
tribunal to be composed of professional members appointed for a
limited term, which can be renewed only once. 142 The treaties set
qualification and experience requirements for these members,
136. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter
Lisbon Treaty]; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 207, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, 140. (discussing investment-related
provisions: "[t]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles,
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade
agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of
intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to
be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies." (emphasis added)) [hereinafter TFEU].
137. The European Union is currently negotiating a number of IIAs on behalf of the
European Union and its Member States. This differs from the pre-Lisbon Treaty practice,
when individual Member States negotiated and entered into BITs on their own behalf.
For older BITs, the future of the treaty may be unclear, especially in cases where both
parties to a treaty are now the EU Member States (intra-EU BITs). Some of these
treaties will be terminated and concluded on behalf of the European Union. For intra-
EU BITs, the European Commission has requested its Member States to terminate the
intra-EU BITs. The request has not always been welcomed by the Member States, as
often the treaty provisions are broader than the exclusive competence of the European
Union, which only covers foreign direct investments (FDIs). And so, there is certain
resistance among the EU Member States to terminate their intra-EU BITs, which now
has motivated the European Commission to initiate infringement proceedings against
states failing to so do (such as Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and
Sweden). See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Asks Member States
to Terminate Their Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (Brussels, June 18, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-5198_en.htm [https://perma.cc/ZPB4-UWF3]
(archived Feb. 11, 2017).
138. See Press Release European Commission, Commission Proposes New
Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations
(Brussels, Sept. 16, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-5651_en.htm
[https://perma.ccl7Y5N-3VA3] (archived Mar. 6, 2017).
139. INTL CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INv. DISPUTES, ADDITIONAL FAciLITY RULES
(effective April 10, 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR-
Enghsh-final.pdf. [https://perma.cc/34SJ-TKY3] (archived Feb. 2, 2017).
140. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23.
141. CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.27-8.28.
142. Id.; EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 3, arts. 12-13.
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establishing that they "shall possess the qualifications required in
their respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or be
jurists of recognised competence," "shall have demonstrated expertise
in public international law," and preferably "shall have expertise in
particular, in international investment law, in international trade law
and the resolution of disputes arising under international investment
or international trade agreements."1 43 Yet, under both FTAs, the new
mechanism of investment dispute resolution will continue to rely on
the commonly used investor-state arbitration rules-the ICSID
Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. 144 If the legitimacy shortcomings of ISDS are in fact
best addressed by replacing private arbitrators with professional
judges, similar provisions in other IIAs concluded by the European
Union may follow. However, it may require some time and a strong
political will because many of today's thirty-three hundred HAs
provide for traditional ISDS.
Outside of the European Union and the ongoing TTIP discussions,
three countries (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia) have chosen to limit
their procedural exposure to investor-state arbitration by leaving the
ICSID Convention.1 45 Another trend in international investment law
has been a cancellation by countries of their BITs1 46 and multilateral
IIAS.1 47 By doing so, they seek not only to revoke their promise to
arbitrate (most commonly, under the ICSID Convention or the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules1 48), but also to eliminate their
obligations with respect to substantive investor protection obligations,
a violation of which can result in arbitration.
The overall goal of these measures is to address the procedural
and structural deficiencies of ISDS. Procedurally, they seek to put the
public on notice about an investor-state arbitration, to grant the public
access to arbitration materials and the award, and to allow
submissions by third parties and non-disputing parties to the treaty.
Structurally, they seek to replace private arbitrators with professional
judges who possess a sufficient level of expertise and experience, who
143. CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.27(4); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 3,
art. 12(4).
144. CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.23(2); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 3, art. 7.
145. ICSID Convention, supra note 18.
146. Notable examples include South Africa and Indonesia, which have been
actively terminating their BITs. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also
International Investment Agreements Navigator, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/1IA [https://perma.cc/7EC8-
7RZU] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (tracking information on the status of IIAs, including
BITs, by economy and country grouping).
147. Gaetano Iorio Fiorelli, Italy Withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty, BAKER
MCKENZIE: GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (May 6, 2015), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/italy-
withdraws-from-energy-charter-treaty-20150507/ [https://perma.cc/S8U9-HTR9]
(archived Feb. 2, 2017) (discussing the Italian government's withdrawal from the ECT).
148. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 20, art. 1(3).
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are financially independent, and who can be held accountable for the
timeliness, consistency, and quality of the legal decisions they make.
Going forward, governments may respond to the European
Commission's call to replace the current ISDS regime with the
permanent international investment court system proposed by the
European Commission.
B. Safeguards to Preserve the Right to Regulate
The above initiatives do not directly address the major challenge
for ISDS today: regulatory disputes and their potential to produce a
chilling effect on the state's power to regulate. Instead, in an attempt
to tackle the threat of regulatory disputes, sovereign states have
turned to more careful treaty drafting. In doing so, they gradually
replace the first generation of investor protection treaties-usually
concise agreements offering broad investor protection obligations-
with modern comprehensive BITs and other IIAs.1 49 These modern
treaties tend to limit the scope and the types of substantive investor
protection obligations and, consequently, the scope of claims a foreign
investor can submit in arbitration. 5 0
Another trend in today's treaty making is the inclusion into HAs
of provisions that reserve for the state the right to regulate-the
safeguard"51 provisions. Most commonly, they recognize the state's
right to adopt measures necessary for the protection of public health,
the environment, or other policy objectives.1 52 Safeguard provisions
can be found in the body of a treaty, its preamble, annexes, or even its
reservations, declarations, and understandings. In the body of the text,
149. Compare, e.g., Investment Policy Hub: 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, UNITED NATIONS UNCTAD (Jan. 22, 2017),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2867 [https://perma.cc/
2PRR-TX36] (archived Feb. 2, 2017) (sixteen articles and an annex), with 2012 U.S.
Model BIT, supra note 12 (thirty-seven articles and three annexes, reflecting more
careful and elaborate treaty-drafting).
150. See, e.g., ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9 (providing foreign investors with
national treatment (Article 9.3) and most-favored-nation treatment (Article 9.4), but not
other common guarantees-such as minimum standard of treatment and non-
expropriation-thereby limiting potential exposure to ISDS under the treaty.
Article 9.12.2 of ChAFTA then further narrows such exposure by providing consent to
ISDS only with respect to claims alleging breach of Article 9.3).
151. See Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA,
39 AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 399 (2013) (applying the term 'safeguard' to both exceptions and
exclusions-discussed further in this Article-with respect to tobacco control measures
and explaining the options for such safeguards for the TPP).
152. See EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 2 (discussing the fact that one of the
recent examples of this practice is Article 13 bis(1): "[t]he Parties reaffirm the right to
regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the
protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals, social or consumer
protection or promotion and protection of cultural diversity').
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a reference to the right to regulate can be placed in a separate article
or incorporated into an article on an individual investor protection,
such as non-expropriation 153 or performance requirements.1 54 The U.S.
Model BIT adds to this practice by also stipulating the state's right to
adopt measures "appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns." 155 Thus, by contrast to most IIAs, the U.S. Model BIT
incorporates the right to regulate on particular subject matter-
environmental protection. This is in addition to other safeguards
already contained in the U.S. Model BIT, such as provisions on
performance requirements, non-conforming measures, essential
security, taxation, and expropriation.1 56
The scope and form of safeguard provisions differ substantially
across investor protection treaties. The scope of the application of
exceptions and exclusions may cover the whole treaty, a particular
chapter, or an individual investor protection obligation. Depending on
the scope, it may exclude application of the treaty provisions to a
measure, sector, or an industry. There is no consistency in the practice
of individual states with regard to the use and application of safeguard
provisions, but all safeguards are alike in that they seek to reserve for
the state some regulatory space by (1) allowing enumerated policy
objectives to serve as an affirmative defense for a measure otherwise
in breach of the treaty and/or by (2) excluding application of the
investment protection treaty to certain subject matter.
1. Exceptions
153. See, e.g., id. § 2, (proving in para. 3 that:"[flor greater certainty, except in the
rare circumstances where the impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in
light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures or
series of measures by a Party that are designed to protect legitimate public policy
objectives do not constitute indirect expropriation"); see also 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra
note 12, annex B ("Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives,
such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.').
154. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 8(3)(c) (in particular,
reserving for the state the right to adopt and maintain "measures, including
environmental measures ... [ that are] necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
or health [and measures that are] related to the conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources.").
155. See, e.g., id. art. 12(3) (recognizing each Party's right to "exercise discretion
with respect to regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial matters, and to
make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities").
156. Id. arts. 8(3)(c), 14, 18, 21, and annex B.
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Provisions of IIAs that most commonly protect the state's power
to regulate are known as exceptions157 in international investment law.
Generally speaking, exceptions are safeguard provisions that reserve
for the state the right to adopt and enforce measures necessary for the
protection of legitimate public welfare objectives, such as human life,
health, the environment, or public morals. 158 Some scholars have
argued that exceptions are distinct from other safeguard provisions in
that they serve as an affirmative defense for regulatory measures
falling within the scope of the exception.1 59  Consequently, if
successfully invoked, exceptions eliminate the state's liability and
damages for such measures, which are otherwise in breach of the
treaty obligations. 160 This is a narrow understanding of exceptions and
is the understanding adopted in this Article. Other scholars, however,
use the word exception in its broad sense, applying it to any deviation
from the investor protection regime, including instances where a
measure is excluded from the application of a treaty. 16 1
157. The variety of terms used with respect to safeguard provisions is astounding
and includes such terms as exceptions, exclusions, exemptions, derogations,
reservations, non-conforming measures (NCM), non-precluded measures (NPM). Among
these terms, the terms exceptions, NCM and NPM are used in the treaties, while most
other terms are employed only in scholarly and public policy debates.
158. See WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. XX 845
(2nd ed. 2007), https://www.wto.org/englishl/res-e/booksp-elanalytic-index_e/
gattl994_07_e.htm [https:/perma.cc/S5UZ-QRLB] (archived Jan. 31, 2017)
("Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions to substantive
obligations established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic policies embodied in
such measures have been recognized as important and legitimate in character." (quoting
the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 1 121, WT[DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12,
1998) [https://perma.cclSP2U-D3JT] (archived Jan. 31, 2017)).
159. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 402-03 ("In the dispute settlement process,
the purpose of an exception is to enable a country to present an affirmative defense of a
measure that would otherwise violate a trade or investment rule. From a health
perspective, the opportunity to defend protects the public interest. From a trade
perspective, the opportunity to "weigh and balance" a health measure protects trade-
promotion objectives from all but the most efficiently designed heath measures.").
160. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 332-35. See also Josef
Ostfansk', How Can States Use Exceptions in Treaties to Defend Tobacco Control
Legislation?, 9 TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT. 1, 3 (2012) (disagreeing with the interpretation
of the function and operation of exceptions, arguing that exceptions effectively remove
the measure from the application of a treaty: "[t]he result of successfully invoking an
exceptions clause is that the treaty does not apply to the particular conduct in question.
In other words, once the conduct falls within the exception, investment protection does
not apply to such conduct. The host state cannot be held liable as there is no breach of
an international obligation").
161. See, e.g., ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 481 (2009) ("[General] exceptions are
used to exclude particular sectors or subject matters from IIA obligations or to permit
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A typical exception can be found in Article XVII(3) of the BIT
between Canada and Romania, which provides that,
[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that
would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between investments
or between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade or
investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a
Contracting Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary:
(a) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement;
(b) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or
(c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.162
In addition, modern IIAs often contain a separate article on
general exceptions, which can be found both in BITs and FTAs (in the
latter case, either as part of the investment chapter or a separate
chapter, usually applicable only to the selected chapters of an FTA).163
Some IIAs incorporate by reference the articles on general exceptions
contained in Article XX 164 and Article XIV16 5 of the General Agreement
measures necessary to meet specific objectives, including protecting essential security
interests, public order, human health and the environment." (emphases added)).
162. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Romania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-Rom.
art. XVII, Aug. 5, 2009, http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105170
[https://perma.cc/7TVU-D9Z4] (archived Jan. 31, 2017).
163. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.1 (the article is a part of Chapter 29 titled
"Exceptions and General Provisions"); ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.8 (this article titled
"General Exceptions" is included directly into the investment chapter of the treaty, and
not into a separate chapter of the FTA applicable to the treaty as a whole); see also
Agreement Between Japan and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay for the Liberalization,
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Uru., art. 22, Jan. 26, 2015; Canada-
China BIT art. 33, Sept. 9, 2012; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Macedonia and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Maced.-Kaz., art. 13, July 2, 2012 [hereinafter
Macedonia-Kazakhstan BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Turkey and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Pak.-Turk., art. 5, May 22, 2012.
164. WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, supra note 158, art. XX (providing, in particular,
that: "[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same condition prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any contracting party of measures .... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health").
165. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994,
https://www.wto.org/english/reselbooksp.e/analyticjindex e/gats_- 02_e.htm#articlel4
[https://perma.cc/E5DW-8QAR] (archived Feb. 2, 2017); see also Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1B, 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183,
33 I.L.M. 1167, https://www.wto.org/english/docs ellegal-e/26-gats.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L656-XT3W] (archived Jan. 31, 2017) (providing, in particular, that: "[s]ubject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), respectively. These two articles allow Member States
to adopt and enforce measures necessary to protect or secure important
public policy objectives, including the protection of public morals and
human or animal health and maintenance of public order. In doing so,
Member States are allowed to "act inconsistently with obligations set
out in other provisions of the respective agreements, provided that all
of the conditions set out therein are satisfied." 166 To date, the WTO has
developed a comprehensive body of law interpreting the scope, degree
of deference, and other elements of general exceptions.167
Exceptions may be difficult for a state to successfully invoke in
ISDS, largely because of the need to satisfy the nexus requirement-
that is, to prove that a measure is necessary to achieve a public policy
objective. 168 Arbitral tribunals have used various criteria to assess a
challenged regulatory measure in view of the state's investor
protection obligations. Borrowing from international customary law,
tribunals sometimes analyze the measure using the stringent "but for"
requirement. 169 In other instances they apply a balancing test or
proportionality analysis. 170 In any case, such analyses always reflect
the tribunal's own perception as to what measure is necessary for the
achievement of the public policy goal.1 7 '
Additionally, general exceptions provide for different permissible
objectives, ranging from public health and morality to environmental
protection. Legal scholars have suggested that exceptions with
different objectives may require a different degree of deference to the
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of
measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health").
166. WTO Analytical Index: General Agreement on Trade in Services, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. XIV, T 74, https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp_e/
analytic-index-e/gats02_e.htm#articlel4 [https://perma.ccX2FC-V93W] (archived
Jan. 31, 2017).
167. See WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, supra note 158, ¶¶ 844-955 (interpreting
and applying general exceptions under Article XX of the GATT in the WTO
jurisprudence); WTO Analytical Index: General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra
note 167, 11 74-92 (interpreting and applying general exceptions under Article XIV of
the GATS). See also Stumberg, supra note 151, at 404 (distinguishing six elements of a
hypothetical exception, including its scope, protection, deference, nexus, objective and
additional restriction, and suggesting that "exceptions have at least four elements and
as many as six; exclusions usually have three").
168. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 405 (explaining that the WTO health
exception does little to prevent litigation because of its complexity, which requires for
stages of analysis, and the "vagueness of text, which gives dispute panels broad
discretion to interpret terms like "necessity" (footnote omitted)).
169. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 161, at 486-87 (discussing the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization's interpretation of the GATT).
170. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 405.
171. Id.
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state's own determination as to what measures are necessary to
achieve a regulatory objective. 172 They further argue that arbitral
tribunals may be willing to allow a state to use the self-judging
exception1 73 to determine what makes a measure "necessary" for some
regulatory objectives but not others. 174 For instance, tribunals might
recognize that a defending state knows better what constitutes its
public morals and what measures are necessary to protect them.175 By
contrast, tribunals might be less willing to defer to the state's own
determination as to what constitutes a threat to public health.' 76
There, the claim is more easily verifiable for a tribunal, for instance,
by relying on scientific evidence.' 7 7 Consequently, invoking a general
exception with a clear legitimate objective may be a highly
unpredictable defense.' 7 8
Finally, exceptions should not be confused with other declarations
that can be made by a state with respect to a treaty, such as
clarifications, understandings, and reservations.17 9 In contrast to these
declarations, which are largely unilateral statements, exceptions are
mutually agreed upon by the treaty parties. As a result, exceptions
change the investor protection regime for all the parties to a treaty,
while declarations do so only for the state that makes a declaration.
Exceptions are also distinct from defenses under customary
international law, such as necessity, force majeure, distress, and
consent.18 0 Most importantly, in contrast to such customary law
172. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 332-36, 369 (arguing that
because some deference to the state's own determination is implied in treaties, "it is
appropriate, both as a matter of treaty interpretation and judicial policy, to read NPM
clauses as incorporating a 'margin of appreciation' that grants states some latitude to
make initial determinations as to whether their actions are covered by an NPM clause.
The function of a tribunal, then, ought to be the determination of the permissible and
legitimate boundaries of the margin of appreciation that arises from the terms of an
NPM clause).
173. See, e.g., Stumberg, supra note 151, at 413-14 (discussing the self-judging
exception).
174. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 332-36.
175. Id. at 364.
176. Id. at 361.
177. Id. at 361 ("What distinguishes public health from most of the other
permissible objectives is that the existence of threats is far more susceptible to objective
scientific proof than, for example, the more subjective threats to a nation's security.").
178. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 403 ("The vagueness of [exceptions'] terms
(like "measures necessary" to protect health) requires interpretation, and the factual
context will change with every measures that a country or investor decides to
challenge.").
179. Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties art. 2(d), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that reservation "means a unilateral statement, however phrased
or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to
a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions
of the treaty in their application to that State") [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
180. See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 161, at 480 (noting that "state
responsibility for breaches of IIA obligations may be precluded under customary
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defenses, exceptions are based on treaty law. They serve as an
affirmative defense for regulatory measures otherwise in breach of
international investment law, performing the function of lex specialis
to other defenses under international law. 181
A separate type of general exception is a security exception 82 such
as the national security exception under Article 2102 of NAFTA18 3 or
the security exceptions under Article 29.2 of the TPP.1M Security
exceptions have specific objectives, typically the "maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security, or protection of [the
host state's] own essential security interests." 85 A survey of essential
security exceptions in BITs and FTAs revealed that most of such
exceptions "are limited in their scope to circumstances related to
periods of war, traffic of arms or other emergency."1 86 Reliance on the
specific security exception is usually accepted for a shorter period of
time, limited by the goal of the exception, such as until international
peace or security is restored. The distinction between the general and
specific exceptions does not always make sense, as some treaties
include maintenance of international peace and security and/or
protection of essential security interests in a single article on general
exceptions.' 8 7
international law on a number of bases, including consent, force majeure and necessity,"
as well as other defenses, such as acquiescence and estoppel).
181. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 321 (explaining that
"customary defenses provide an excuse for breaching a treaty that may absolve a state
of international legal responsibility after the fact. In contrast, NPM clauses remove
certain types of state actions from the substantive protections of a particular treaty
instrument"; and further distinguishing NPM and customary defenses in terms of "their
theoretical justification, their source of legal authority, and their scope of applicability').
182. See generally Katia Yannaca-Small, Essential Security Interests under
International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM
OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 93-134 (2007) (providing a review of the security
exceptions across various investor protection treaties, provisions of customary
international law, interpretations by arbitral tribunals in investor-state disputes, and
containing a table of BITs and FTAs with investment chapters, which include provisions
on essential security interests).
183. NAFTA, supra note 39, art. 2102.
184. See TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.2 (providing "[n]othing in this Agreement shall
be construed to: (a) require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the
disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the
fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests");
see also Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Egypt-
Switz., art. 10, June 7, 2010 (outlining security exceptions).
185. Id. art. 29.2.
186. Yannaca-Small, supra note 182, at 94; see also ECT, supra note 42, art. 24.
187. See, e. g., Macedonia-Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 163, art. 13 ("General
exceptions[:] Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as interfering to commit by
the Parties of the actions necessary for protection of national security or measures
necessary for maintenance of a public order, or measures in line with their obligations
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2. Exclusions
Another group of safeguard provisions is exclusions. In legal
scholarship and tribunal awards, exclusions are sometimes considered
to be a type of exception.188 But other scholars distinguish exclusions
from exceptions, employing the term exclusions solely with respect to
provisions that exclude application of a treaty (its chapters, or
individual provisions) from a certain measure all together.1 89
Consequently, as these scholars explain, with respect to covered
measures, exclusions "deny jurisdiction for dispute settlement and
hence . . . preclude liability for trade sanctions or compensation to
investors."o9 0 By contrast, exceptions apply to measures covered by the
treaty, but serve as an affirmative defense once the violation of a treaty
is established.1 9 '
A common example of an exclusion is a tax carve-out-a provision
removing tax measures from the application of a BIT.192 The most
recent example of an exclusion-and a very troublesome one in my
view-is the option for the subject-matter jurisdictional carve-out with
respect to tobacco control measures in the TPP.193
The distinction between exceptions and exclusions is not always
easy to draw. The text of the treaty and its interpretation are crucial
to identifying the type of safeguard to which a particular provision
belongs. Generally, exceptions contain wording as follows: "nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health."1 94 Exclusions often use
words such as the following: "nothing in this Agreement shall apply
to . . ." or a similar statement of excluding nature.' 9 5
under the United Nations Charter for maintenance of international peace and security,
provided that application of such measures would not mean unconditioned or
unreasonable discrimination by the Party, or the latent restriction of investments."); see
also Pakistan-Turkey BIT, supra note 163, art. 5 (including security interests within
general exceptions).
188. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 401.
189. Id. at 401-02.
190. Id. at 402.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 21 (establishing a carve-out
for taxation measures, except as provided by the treaty itself, for instance, under Article
6 (Expropriation), which is applicable to taxation measures); see also TPP, supra note 3,
art. 29.4; Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 23.3, June 30, 2007 (entered into force
Mar. 15, 2012), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-
text [https://perma.cc/7GSP-LRRK] (archived Feb. 2, 2017) ("Except as set out in this
Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures.").
193. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5.
194. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX.
195. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 22.3, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M
1248 (stating that "[e[xcept as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall
apply to taxation measures").
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Legal scholars have identified two types of exclusions: partial and
full exclusions.1 96 Partial exclusions exclude application of a chapter or
an article of the treaty "to a particular product, a subject (e.g., tobacco
control), a sector, or more broadly, to a particular country."' 9 7 Full
exclusions carve out certain measures or a subject of regulation from
the application of a treaty as a whole.s98 Along these lines, the term
carve-out-which is more common in scholarly and policy papers than
in treaties-is used as a synonym for full exclusion with regard to
broad provisions that exclude application of a treaty to a sector,
industry, or activity.1 99 Yet there is no uniformity in the application of
these terms. Scholars and commentators may use the term carve-out
even where an exclusion removes a measure from the application of a
separate chapter only. 20 0
3. Non-Precluded Measures
Other investor protection treaties provide for safeguards by
enumerating measures with respect to which a treaty will not apply. 201
In international investment law, such measures are known as non-
precluded measures (NPMs) 2 0 2 or non-conforming measures
(NCMs). 203 Modern IIAs often contain annexes with schedules of all
existing NPMs and provide for continuation, renewal, or amendment
of such measures. State parties may also agree that a treaty will not
196. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 401-02.
197. Id. at 401.
198. Id. at 402.
199. Id.
200. See Puig & Shaffer, supra note 30 (referring to the TPP's tobacco safeguard
provision under Article 29.5 as a "carve-out," while the article allows a state party to
deny the benefits of only Section B of the TPP's investment chapter, and not of the TPP
as a whole).
201. See e.g., TPP, supra note 3, ch. 9, art. 9.12.1.
202. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment art. 14.1, Bahr.-U.S., Sept. 29, 1999, S. TREATY DOc. No. 106-25 ("This
Treaty shall not preclude a Party from applying measures which it considers necessary
for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests."
(emphasis added)); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment art. IX, Ukr.-U.S., Mar. 4, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-37 ("This Treaty
shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the
maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own
essential security interests." (emphasis added)).
203. See TPP, supra note 3, ch. 9, art. 9.12.1 (providing for an exclusion from
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment for any existing non-conforming
measure-as specified for each state party in its Schedule to Annex I to the TPP-as well
as the continuation, renewal, and certain amendments to such measure); see also id. ch.
9, art. 9.12.2 (providing for an exclusion for "any measure that a Party adopts or
maintains with respect to sectors, subsectors or activities" as specified for the respective
state party in its Schedule to Annex II of the TPP).
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apply to any future measure adopted or maintained by the state party
in a particular industry, sector, or activity. 204 Consequently, as Burke-
White and von Staden explain, NPMs perform a "risk-allocation
function" by "transferring the costs of harming an investment from
host states to investors in exceptional circumstances." 205
Exceptions and NPMs perform essentially the same function: they
provide the state with the regulatory space for domestic
policymaking. 206 A state may prefer exceptions because they allow a
state to keep its regulatory options open, adopting any measure it sees
fit in order to achieve a particular regulatory objective. Exceptions,
however, require a case-by-case assessment with regard to whether a
measure falls within the scope of a legitimate regulatory objective.
Treaty provisions do not provide much guidance in this respect, and so
arbitral tribunals often have to decide what standard to apply and how
much deference to give to the state's own determination. 207 By
contrast, NPMs are listed up front by the state party to an investor
protection treaty. Consequently, NPM provisions are more limiting on
the state's regulatory power, but they provide more certainty to the
investor protection regime by putting a foreign investor on notice with
regard to any non-conforming measures. NPMs are often used in BITs
concluded by the United States, while other countries largely rely on
exceptions.20s
Overall, there is no consistency in the practice of individual states
with respect to providing for exceptions and other safeguard provisions
in investor protection treaties. A state may include exceptions in some
of its BITs but not in others. It may also use varying terminology across
a treaty. For instance, the United States and Uruguay employ the term
non-conforming measures in Article 14 of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT
(2005),209 but in Article 18(2) of the same treaty they utilize the term
preclude to reserve for the state parties the right to adopt measures
204. E.g., TPP, supra note 3, ch. 9, art. 9.12.2.
205. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 314.
206. See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 161, at 483 (arguing that "[t]he
reference to non-conforming measures is simply another way to refer to express
reservations to the treaty"); see also Stumberg, supra note 151, at 403 (observing that
"[s]ome investment arbitrators and commentators view NPM and exception as
interchangeable concepts, depending on the plain language of the text (footnotes
omitted)).
207. For the WTO jurisprudence interpreting and applying general exceptions
under Article XX of the GATT, see, for instance, WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, supra
note 158, 11 844-955.
208. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 403 (noting that "[w]hat some call an NPM,
however, Canada, Singapore, Mexico, India, Korea and other countries call exceptions in
both investment and trade agreements" (footnote omitted)).
209. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 14, Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-9.
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necessary for the protection of essential security-which indicates a
non-precluded measure. 210
Studies of safeguard provisions in IIAs report that exceptions are
generally rare in the context of BITs, 21x but are more common in recent
FTAs and the newest generation of BITs. 212 Some scholars have even
suggested that BITs are no longer exclusively investor protection
treaties. 213 Instead, they argue, there is a substantial element of
protection of states and the states' right to regulate, although usually
only in "exceptional circumstances." 214
At the end of the day, the application of a safeguard provision in
ISDS depends on interpretation of the treaty text by a tribunal. To
date, tribunal interpretations of exceptions in ISDS have been rare 215
and inconsistent. 216 Where exceptions are available under the treaty,
they may serve as a safeguard mechanism ensuring that more weight
is given to the state's regulatory interests than to the rights of foreign
investors. Yet, it is unclear whether arbitral tribunals will be willing
to give a particular exception a broad interpretation, or, instead, will
210. Id., art. 18 (providing that "nothing in this Treaty shall be construed .... to
preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace
or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests" (emphasis added)).
211. See, e.g., Ostransky, supra note 160, at 2 ("Exception clauses are not rare
feature of IIAs - they appear in bilateral investment treaties ('BITs) entered into by
Canada, the United States, Switzerland, China, Colombia and New Zealand. They are
increasingly being included in newly concluded Free Trade Agreements ('FTAs').
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that they are a regular type of provisions, as they are
estimated to appear in approximately only 10 per cent of IIAs." (footnotes omitted)).
212. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 313 (establishing in 2008
that at least 10 per cent of BITs (two hundred treaties of about two thousand BITs then
in force) have clauses on non-precluded measures).
213. Id. at 316 ("[This] Article's first theoretical contribution is to question the
standard assumption that BITs are solely the instruments of investment protection by
recognizing that such treaties often incorporate significant exceptions that preserve
state freedom of action in exceptional circumstances.").
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., id. at 337 ("Despite the prevalence of NPM clauses in BITs, they were
not a focus of investor-state arbitration until the Argentine financial collapse of 2001-
2002.").
216. Burke-White and von Staden are very critical of the tribunal's interpretation
of the NPM clause in the United States and Argentina BIT Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment. Arg.-U.S., art. XI, Nov. 14,
1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-2, and the necessity defense under customary
international law in three arbitrations involving Argentina. See also CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Arg., Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award (ICSID May 12, 2005),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4/DC504_En.pdf
[https://perma.cclNL2L-LHFL] (archived Jan. 20, 2017); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg.,
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (ICSID Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9ZL-337E] (archived
Jan. 20, 2017); Enron Corp. v. Arg., Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (ICSID May 22, 2007),
http://www.italaw.comlsites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf [https://perma.cc/
35AY-6REX] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
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subject a state's regulatory interest to its investor protection
obligations. 217
Finally, judging by the WTO jurisprudence and the decisions of
arbitral tribunals interpreting exceptions and exclusions provisions, it
is unclear whether exceptions expand or narrow a state's right to
regulate. Some scholars have argued that, apart from a greater
certainty of law, exceptions add little to the IIA regime, as arbitral
tribunals have recognized a state's right to regulate even in the
absence of explicit provisions to this effect.2 18 Others have suggested
that exceptions provisions in HAs may in fact limit a state's right to
regulate.2 19 For instance, the nexus requirement in the general
exception can limit the scope of a state's regulatory power by allowing
the state to adopt only those measures which are necessary for the
achievement of a legitimate public policy goal. Interpreted in the most
narrow way-that is, applying a "but for" requirement under
customary international law-such a condition would clear fewer
regulatory measures than the state could generally adopt for
legitimate public policy objectives.
C. The TPP Tobacco Carve-Out
1. Analyzing the Treaty Provisions
The TPP is the largest and most complex trade liberalization and
investment agreement ever signed. It is also particularly rich in
exceptions, exclusions, carve-outs, exceptions to exceptions, and other
safeguard provisions. 220 For the ISDS regime, the most notable of these
217. For instance, the state's right to regulate appears to be secondary and
subordinated to the investor rights in treaties permitting the state to adopt any measure
"otherwise consistent with" the BIT or investment chapter in the FTA. See TPP, supra
note 3, art. 9.16 (demonstrating the wording of these provisions suggests that the state's
measure may not be in breach of the investor protection obligations and, as such, more
narrow that the general right to regulate).
218. See, e.g., Jbrn Griebel, The New EU Investment Policy Approach, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 304, 317-18 (Marc Bungenberg et al.
eds., 2015) ("Explicit clauses would therefore only have the effect to codify such
tendencies and to provide for greater certainty of law.").
219. See, e.g., Stumberg, supra note 151, at 417-18 (noting that additional
restrictions prevent countries from "abusing" the exceptions).
220. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bollyky, TPP Tobacco Exception Proves the New Rule in
Trade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/trade/tpp-
tobacco-exception-proves-new-rule-trade/p37509 [https://perma.ccZGE5-RGRU]
(archived Jan. 20, 2017) ("At nearly 2,700 pages, the TPP may be the longest, most
complex, and exception-filled trade agreement ever negotiated. There are exceptions to
general principle (Art. 2.4.1), exceptions to exceptions (Art. 2.4.7), explicit exclusions
(Art. 9.11), implicit exclusions (Annex 15-A), grandfathering (Annex 18-B), optional
undertakings (Art. 25.4.1), clarifications (Art. 13.2.3), caveats (Art. 11.1), limiting rules
of application (Art. 11.2.2-5), and, of course, carve-outs (Annex 17-D; Art. 16.9;
Art. 9.7.6). Exceptions appear in nearly every chapter of the TPP, including its
preamble.").
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provisions is the tobacco carve-out contained in Article 29.5 (Tobacco
Control Measures) of Chapter 29 (Exceptions and General Provisions).
The article provides as follows:
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment)
with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party. Such
a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9
(Investment) if a Party has made such an election. If a Party has not elected to
deny benefits with respect to such claims by the time of the submission of such a
claim to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect
to deny benefits during the proceedings. For greater certainty, if a Party elects
to deny benefits with respect to such claims, any such claim shall be
dismissed.221
There are also two footnotes to this article that explain the
operation of the carve-out with respect to the TPP's denial-of-benefits
and state-to-state dispute settlement provisions and define the term
tobacco control measure. The first of them-footnote 11-clarifies that
"[fjor greater certainty, this Article does not prejudice: (i) the operation
of Article 9.15 (Denial of Benefits); or (ii) a Party's rights under
Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement) in relation to a tobacco control
measure." 222 The second footnote-footnote 12-defines a tobacco
control measure as "a measure of a Party related to the production or
consumption of manufactured tobacco products (including products
made or derived from tobacco), their distribution, labelling, packaging,
advertising, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, or use, as well as
enforcement measures, such as inspection, recordkeeping, and
reporting requirements." 223 This definition is exceptionally broad and
visibly seeks to encompass an absolute majority of the tobacco
industry's operations, as well as the consumption of tobacco. The
definition appears to exclude the "agricultural tobacco production," 224
as the footnote concludes by noting that "[flor greater certainty, a
221. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5. (footnotes omitted). The wording of the tobacco
carve-out provision is reminiscent of the denial-of-benefits provisions common for
modern IIAs. However, the TPP already contains a separate denial-of-benefits provision
in Article 9.15 of the investment chapter. By contrast, the tobacco carve-out is included
in another chapter of the TPP-Chapter 29 "Exceptions and General Provisions."
Furthermore, a footnote to Article 29.5 of the TPP specifically indicates that the article
does not preclude the operation of the TPP's denial-of-benefits provision. As such, two
provisions appear to be distinct and have different scopes of application. Noticeably,
unlike regular denial-of-benefits provisions, the tobacco carve-out only covers the ISDS
benefit of the TPP. It does not allow to deny the benefits of substantive investor
protections that may be denied under denial-of-benefits provisions. The carve-out can
also be employed after the benefit of ISDS is invoked by a foreign investor by filing a
claim in arbitration. Consequently, the tobacco carve-out is a distinctly unique provision,
unlike any other safeguard provision or denial-of-benefits provision known to IIAs.
222. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 n.11.
223. Id. art. 29.5 n.12.
224. See Bollyky, supra note 220.
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measure with respect to tobacco leaf that is not in the possession of a
manufacturer of tobacco products or that is not part of a manufactured
tobacco product is not a tobacco control measure." 225
The tobacco carve-out under Article 29.5 of the TPP is distinct
from any other safeguard provision in international investment law.
Most strikingly, it deals only with a procedural obligation of investor
protection by giving the host state the option to deny the benefits of
ISDS with respect to a claim challenging a tobacco control measure.
Accordingly, the TPP tobacco carve-out does not reserve the regulatory
space for the treaty parties with respect to tobacco production,
marketing, sale, use, or consumption. It only targets ISDS by allowing
a state party to revoke its (offer of) consent to ISDS under the TPP. By
contrast, other exceptions and exclusions in the investor protection
agreements focus on reserving for the state the right to regulate a
particular industry or a type of activity. Apart from the TPP, not a
single investor protection agreement provides the state with the ability
to avoid ISDS on a case-by-case basis when a dispute arises. This
means Article 29.5 is not a subject-matter (tobacco) carve-out from the
TPP, but rather an option for the subject-matter jurisdictional
exclusion from ISDS.
Another distinction between this- tobacco carve-out and other
safeguard provisions is the option it gives to the host state to deny the
benefits of ISDS with respect to a claim related to a tobacco control
measure. This option can be exercised prior to the submission of a claim
to investment treaty arbitration, or after the investor-state arbitration
has commenced-which is especially worrisome, in my view. This puts
the claimant and the tribunal in the uncomfortable position of not
knowing whether their arbitration will proceed, bringing uncertainty
to the arbitral process.
Furthermore, the TPP tobacco carve-out does not prohibit state-
to-state arbitration. 226 It also does not guide the claimant as to the
availability of an alternative forum for its claim. The tobacco carve-out
does not even seek to provide the host state with the regulatory space
to freely regulate the tobacco industry, the use and consumption of
tobacco products, or the effects of tobacco on the environment. Instead,
the primary and only focus of the carve-out is ISDS, or, more
specifically, ensuring that a defending state may revoke jurisdiction of
an investment treaty tribunal over claims challenging a tobacco control
measure.
A bigger problem with the proposed TPP tobacco carve-out is that
it provides the host state with the ability to unilaterally revoke its offer
225. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 n.12.
226. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 n.11 (noting that "[flor greater certainty, this
Article does not prejudice: (i) the operation of Article 9.15 (Denial of Benefits); or (ii) a
Party's rights under Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement) in relation to a tobacco control
measure").
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of consent to investor-state arbitration. This goes against the
fundamental principle of irrevocability of consent in ISDS. According
to this principle, once a foreign investor perfects a state's consent to
ISDS by submitting a claim to arbitration, a party to a dispute cannot
unilaterally revoke its consent.22 7 And yet, this is exactly what the TPP
tobacco carve-out allows the host state to do. Such an option directly
contradicts the provisions of the ICSID Convention, 228 which is one of
the alternative mechanisms of arbitration that can be chosen by a
claimant under Article 9.19.4 of the TPP.229
Will this tobacco carve-out permit the state to regulate the tobacco
industry without the fear that its regulatory measures might be
challenged by a foreign investor? I strongly doubt it. It is of course true
that, if under Article 29.5 a host state elects to deny the benefits of
ISDS with respect to a claim, the state will generally avoid an investor-
state arbitration with regard to a tobacco control measure. However,
the TPP's tobacco carve-out does not make the state free to adopt
measures necessary to protect human life, health, or the environment
from the effects of tobacco. Article 29.5 on its own does not eliminate a
state's substantive obligations, given to foreign investors, including
those in the tobacco industry. There is certainly nothing to this effect
in the carve-out itself, which, on its face, is concerned with avoiding
ISDS but not with strengthening a state's right to regulate for the
benefit of the public. Consequently, if a dispute arises with regard to a
tobacco control measure, a foreign investor might still have a
substantive claim, but, without ISDS, may not have a meaningful
forum in which to submit it.
Moreover, the tobacco carve-out in the TPP does not help a
defending state either. If a dispute escalates into litigation or
arbitration, a defending state will not be able to invoke the tobacco
carve-out in its defense. As just argued, Article 29.5 of the TPP does
not grant the right to regulate as such. A defending state could look for
alternative safeguards in the TPP, such as Article 9.16 (Investment
227. See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 222 ("It is generally accepted that
once a state has given its consent to arbitrate investment disputes and this consent has
been perfected, it cannot be revoked unilaterally." (footnote omitted)). See also RUDOLF
DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 254
(2012) (discussing that apart from treaties, such as BITs and other IIAs, consent to
investment arbitration may be given in domestic laws of the host state or in an
investment contract between the parties, for instance, a concession agreement).
228. ICSID Convention, supra note 18, art. 25(1) ("When the parties have given
their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.").
229. TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19.4 ('The claimant may submit a claim referred to
in paragraph 1 under one of the following alternatives: (a) the ICSID Convention and
the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both the
respondent and the Party of the claimant are parties to the ICSID Convention.").
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and Environmental, Health and Other Regulatory Objectives) 230 -one
of the exceptions in the investment chapter. However, this article also
does not secure a state's right to regulate for legitimate public policy
objectives, such as the protection of public health. Instead, it reiterates
the host state's right to regulate foreign investors "to ensure that
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive
to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives." 231
To successfully invoke Article 9.16 in a dispute resolution, the host
state would have to ensure that any government measure adopted
pursuant to Article 9.16 falls within the scope of the article's regulatory
objectives. The state will also have to demonstrate that its measures
were directed to the regulation of a foreign investor's activity in its
territory, but not to the regulation for the benefit of the public at large.
For instance, Australia would not be able to invoke Article 9.16 of the
TPP to defend its plain tobacco packaging legislation precisely because
its legislation has a broad public policy objective-the protection of
public health. 232 The case would be different if Australia sought to
regulate Philip Morris's operations in Australia to ensure that the
tobacco company operates in a manner sensitive to the country's
regulatory objectives. Some may disagree with this interpretation of
Article 9.16 of the TPP, but an analysis of its text indicates that a host
state will certainly have less leeway to successfully invoke Article 9.16
than, for instance, to rely on a general exception under Article XX of
the GATT.
Additionally, the TPP requires the host state's measures under
Article 9.16 to be "otherwise consistent" with Chapter 9 of the TPP-
the investment chapter. 233 This requirement makes any policy-making
initiatives by a host state pursuant to Article 9.16 secondary and
subordinated to the rights of a foreign investor in the host state. 234 As
a result, a host state will have to ensure that its regulatory measures
under Article 9.16 are consistent with its investor protection
obligations under Chapter 9 of the TPP. In contrast, more broadly
worded general exceptions allow the host state to adopt regulatory
measures in deviation from its investor protection obligations under
230. TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.16 (providing that "[n]othing in this Chapter shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives").
231. Id. art. 9.16.
232. See Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1 (noting that this proposition is what
Australia argued in its investor-state arbitration with Philip Morris).
233. TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.16.
234. See, e.g., Ostfansky, supra note 160, at 3 ("In this sense, the idea of pursuing
policy ends .... is an exception, whilst following international investment obligations is
the norm. Viewed in this way, we see that international investment law positions itself
as superior to domestic considerations, and as the ultimate arbiter of what policy
objectives may or may not be pursued.").
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the IIA regime. Consequently, Article 9.16 of the TPP will be relevant
and applicable only to some government measures seeking to regulate
the activities of the foreign investors in the country. Article 9.16 will
not provide the host state with the regulatory space for broad domestic
policymaking.
Other provisions of the TPP that can be of use for state parties
seeking to protect their regulatory measures include Article 9.12 (Non-
Conforming Measures) and paragraph 3(b) of Annex 9-B
(Expropriation). In particular, Annex 9-B seeks to distinguish between
legitimate regulatory measures and indirect expropriation. In doing so,
it gives a very strong level of protection to the state's regulatory power
by providing that "[n]on-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriation, except in rare circumstances."23 5
This provision thus establishes a very high threshold for proving
indirect expropriation, limiting it to instances of discriminatory
regulatory actions by the state. Other exceptions in the TPP are either
not applicable to the investment chapter (e.g., general exceptions
under Article 29.1236) or are not relevant to measures adopted for
general public welfare objectives because of their specific public policy
goals (e.g., "maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the protection of [a State's] own essential security
interests" under Article 29.2;237 or "adopting or maintaining restrictive
measures with regard to payments or transfers relating to the
movement of capital" under Article 29.3.2238).
As a legal rule, the TPP tobacco carve-out will most likely not
produce the effect it is meant to achieve: to allow a state to freely
regulate the tobacco industry. This TPP provision is also questionable
as to its consistency with a state's other international law obligations,
such as those under the ICSID Convention, as it allows a defending
state to unilaterally revoke its consent to ISDS. But the tobacco carve-
out is also a bad public policy choice. It leaves foreign investors that
235. TPP, supra note 3, annex 9-B, T 3(b), n.37 (providing (within the Article's
footnote): "[flor greater certainty and without limiting the scope of this subparagraph,
regulatory actions to protect public health include, among others, such measures with
respect to the regulation, pricing and supply of, and reimbursement for, pharmaceuticals
(including biological products), diagnostics, vaccines, medical devices, gene therapies
and technologies, health-related aids and appliances and blood and blood-related
products").
236. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.1. Article 29.1 on general exceptions incorporates
and makes part of the TPP agreement Article XX of GATT 1994 and its interpretative
notes, as well as article XIV of GATS, to a list of enumerated chapters of the TPP.
Chapter 9 on investment is not listed among these chapters, making general exceptions
not applicable to investment chapter.
237. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.2.
238. Id. art. 29.3.2.
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have claims under the TPP's investment chapter without a meaningful
dispute resolution forum in which to pursue their claims. It also raises
an array of difficult questions as to what other regulatory measures, if
any, should be protected with individual jurisdictional carve-outs.
From a public policy perspective, the tobacco industry is an easy
target. There is a strong consensus among scientists that tobacco
consumption negatively affects every part of the human body,
increasing the chances of developing cancer, heart disease, stroke, and
many other health issues. According to the National Cancer Institute,
smoking "causes cancers of the lung, esophagus, larynx, mouth, throat,
kidney, bladder, liver, pancreas, stomach, cervix, colon, and rectum, as
well as acute myeloid leukemia."2 39 Most people would probably
concede that there is a strong need for government regulation in this
industry. But how to provide for a state's regulatory power with respect
to other sectors and activities in the IIA regime is a difficult question.
What areas should be included on a list of legitimate regulatory
objectives? Soda drinks portion limits? Genetically modified food?
Atomic energy? Should there be similar jurisdictional carve-outs in
trade and investment agreements for these as well? In other words,
how do we identify sectors and activities that warrant carve-outs from
those that do not?
The answers to these difficult questions require balancing
important public policy objectives and making hard choices. However,
it is absolutely clear that a state cannot afford to protect its domestic
policymaking by incorporating individual carve-outs for each sector or
activity it wants to regulate.
2. The Tobacco Carve-Out as Part of the Global Reform of ISDS
On a broader scale, looking at the structural, procedural, and
substantive changes to ISDS together, it is immediately clear that
removing the most contentious public policy claims from the
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is not a solution to the problem of
regulatory disputes.
First, unless there is an alternative treaty regime, as is the case
for taxation matters, industry-specific carve-outs do not make sense in
view of the improvements introduced to ISDS to date. Take, for
instance, transparency and legitimacy initiatives. Implemented
successfully, they will convert ISDS into the most competent
instrument of investment dispute resolution. No other court in the
world would be better positioned to resolve regulatory disputes than
ISDS in its improved version.
239. Harms of Cigarette Smoking and Health Benefits of Quitting, NAT'L CANCER
INST. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/tobacco/
cessation-fact-sheet#rl [https://perma.cc/JHH2-VANX] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
[VOL. 50:355404
20171 THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INVESTOR-STATEARBITRATION
Second, by removing the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals over a
whole industry or sector, investors are deprived of the benefits of ISDS
and left with no other option but to resort to domestic courts or
diplomatic protection 240-the same mechanisms ISDS was created to
replace. Yet, due to the perceived bias of domestic courts and state
immunity concerns, litigating investment disputes in the courts of the
host state or any other country is not an ideal, or even a feasible, option
due to state immunity that sovereign states generally enjoy.
Furthermore, litigating disputes over state regulatory measures is an
even more challenging task because of their public policy implications.
Nevertheless, foreign investors will have no other forum but domestic
courts unless they are allowed to use investor-state arbitration.
Third, international arbitral tribunals have long proved capable
of resolving public policy concerns in the context of private dispute
resolution.241 Investor-state arbitration, because of its hybrid 24 2
origin, is even better positioned to take into account public policy
considerations. There is no reason to doubt the ability of arbitrators to
address regulatory disputes in investor-state arbitrations.
With these considerations in mind, we should reconsider and
avoid jurisdictional subject-matter carve-outs, unless there is an
alternative treaty regime in place for the subject matter we seek to
exclude. For instance, tax carve-outs-the most recognized subject-
matter exclusions to the IIA regime to date-have arguably worked
because tax matters generally fall under a network of tax treaties that
have their own dispute resolution mechanisms. 243 In the case of the
tobacco industry, and other sectors and activities that may follow in
the footsteps of the TPP tobacco carve-out, there is no comparable
international law regime in place.
240. For instance, the tobacco carve-out in the TPP does not prejudice the state
parties' rights under Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement). Consequently, a foreign investor
may seek assistance of its home state to commence a dispute settlement procedure under
TPP's Chapter 28 with respect to a tobacco control measure.
241. Vera Korzun, Arbitrating Antitrust Claims: From Suspicion to Trust, 48 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 867, 930 (2016) (arguing that international arbitration "has repeatedly
proved capable of settling private disputes involving public policy concerns, such as
international arbitration of domestic antitrust claims . .. [and] has gained trust not only
from private parties choosing arbitration for the resolution of their international
disputes, but also from national courts and public antitrust authorities").
242. See generally Douglas, supra note 37.
243. See generally JULIEN CHAISSE, E15INITIATIVE, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND TAXATION: FROM COEXISTENCE TO COOPERATION (2016), http://el5initiative.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09fE15-Investment-Chaisse-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QML6-JKPD] (archived Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing the coexistence of tax treaties and
international investment agreements, including the dispute resolution mechanisms
under such instruments of international law). See also Thomas Wlde, National Tax
Measures Affecting Foreign Investors under the Discipline of International Investment
Treaties, 102 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 55 (2008).
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Consequently, the TPP tobacco carve-out is anything but the gold
standard for regulatory objectives. The tobacco carve-out does not help
anyone. It does not help sovereign states in securing regulatory space
for tobacco control measures, and it certainly does not help foreign
investors in the tobacco industry, as they will not know in advance
whether they can rely on the benefits of ISDS. Moreover, investors can
be deprived of such benefits even after they submit a claim to
arbitration.
In addition, once a claim with a reference to a tobacco control
measure is submitted to arbitration, one can expect "fights for
jurisdiction" by arbitral tribunals in instances where it is unclear
whether a tobacco control measure is being challenged in arbitration
or, instead, is being invoked by a claimant to substantiate its claim of
expropriation or violation of the FET standard. The outcome of these
fights for jurisdiction will often depend on the standard used by
arbitral tribunals (e.g., relying on the self-judging principle, or seeking
a joint determination by the state parties) in determining what
constitutes a claim "challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party"
under Article 29.5 of the TPP. 24 4
When such preliminary issues arise in an international
commercial arbitration, courts are always there as a fallback solution
for disputing parties. There is no such luxury for foreign investors in
the ISDS world. Once the ISDS option falls apart, a foreign investor
would have to revert to the outdated methods of investment dispute
resolution that ISDS sought to replace-diplomatic protection or
litigation in the (biased) domestic courts of the host state where an
investment treaty is self-executing and provides a private right of
action.24 5 These are very unfortunate projections for the TPP,
considering the undeniable merits and track record of investment
treaty arbitration.
D. Seeking Alternative Solutions
The nature of ISDS claims has evolved over the years from
relatively simple claims of discrimination and expropriation to claims
challenging the legitimacy of government measures as part of a claim
of regulatory expropriation or FET violation. Multinational
corporations have acquired, through ISDS, an unprecedented
opportunity to interfere with a government's ability to regulate for the
244. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 (footnotes omitted).
245. See, e.g., Roger Alford, BIT Provisions That are Self-Executing But Do Not
Confer a Private Right of Action, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/201 1/09/30/bit-provisions-that-are-self-executing-but-
do-not-confer-a-private-right-of-action/ [https://perma.cclYX2F-728D] (archived Jan. 23,
2017) (pointing to the U.S.-Rwanda BIT as an example of an investor protection treaty
with both self-executing and non-self-executing provisions, but providing no private
rights of action enforceable in U.S. courts).
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public interest, encroaching on a core feature of state sovereignty.
Multinational corporations have also demonstrated the willingness to
invoke their ISDS right, at times employing inventive treaty- and
forum-shopping techniques in search of a more beneficial investor
protection regime.
In response to these downsides of modern ISDS, governments and
other stakeholders have introduced a series of procedural and
structural changes to ISDS, focusing on increasing transparency,
consistency, and the overall legitimacy of investor-state arbitration. To
address concerns over regulatory disputes, they have also sought to
clarify their substantive investor protection obligations, to revoke the
offer to arbitrate in IIAs, or to withdraw from the ICSID Convention.
Along these lines, the drafters of the TPP have attempted the most
inventive approach to date: a tobacco carve-out as the first ever subject-
matter jurisdictional exclusion. Yet, as argued above, the tobacco
carve-out on its own, and, even together with other safeguard
provisions in the TPP, is unable to resolve the challenges posed by
regulatory disputes. Consequently, alternative solutions are needed to
ensure that a balance is reached in ISDS between the interests of a
state in preserving space for domestic policymaking and the interests
of foreign investors who choose to invest in the host state in part
relying on offered investor protections.
But, first and foremost, irrespective of the forum used to resolve
investment disputes-arbitration or domestic or international courts-
the substantive investor protection regime must be improved. Arbitral
tribunals and courts interpret and apply provisions of investment
treaties in the merit phase of international dispute resolution. If no
reference to the right to regulate is made in a treaty, any of these
dispute resolution institutions may apply textualism and conclude that
no right to regulate is reserved for a state, thus shifting the balance to
foreign investors. Although the chances of this happening are slim in
modern ISDS, it is still prudent to include a reference to the right to
regulate in BITs and other IIAs.
First, the right to regulate for legitimate government objectives
should be included in the preamble of investor protection agreements.
Arbitral tribunals and state parties may not view such a reference as
creating an international law obligation, but it can serve as an
indication that the right to regulate is reserved for the host state. The
list of public policy objectives for state regulation can be tailored for
the needs of treaty parties, but, at a minimum, should include the
protection of human life, health, and the environment.
Second, the right to regulate in the context of a non-expropriation
obligation raises fewer concerns. Investor protection treaties typically
include comprehensive provisions on expropriation and may also
address regulatory expropriation. Even where no right to regulate is
mentioned in the treaty, arbitral tribunals have consistently
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acknowledged a state's right to regulate. Over the years tribunals have
developed a very high threshold for establishing indirect expropriation.
Here, adding a separate clause to the treaty providing that, in the
absence of discrimination, regulatory measures do not amount to
expropriation could further strengthen the state in the IIA regime. 2 46
Such a provision would prevent investors from bringing frivolous
claims and would provide guidance to arbitral tribunals with regard to
distinguishing between instances of legitimate non-compensable
regulation and indirect expropriation.
Third, there is a strong need for clear criteria in arbitration to
identify when regulation by a host state may amount to a FET
violation. Presently, arbitral tribunals are left to their own devices in
identifying and establishing such criteria. In attempting to balance the
right of the state against the rights of investors, they have generally
relied on the proportionality criteria and showed deference to the
state's own determination. Yet a clear rule would contribute to the
predictability of the ISDS regime and would certainly eliminate
frivolous claims of a FET violation through challenges of government
measures.
Fourth, exceptions and other safeguard provisions provide a
critical safety net for all other challenges to a state's regulatory
measures through ISDS. General exceptions are especially useful in
this respect, as they allow a state to adopt measures that deviate from
its investor protection obligations. Yet, as Robert Stumberg has
pointed out, general exceptions in trade liberalization and investment
agreements may not be general in their scope. 24 7 For instance, in the
U.S. FTA practice, the GATT/GATS general exceptions are made
applicable only to select chapters of a treaty, which do not include the
investment chapter. 248 The most recent example of this practice is the
TPP itself. It incorporates by reference and makes part of the TPP,
mutatis mutandis, Article XX of GATT 1994 and its interpretative
notes, as well as Article XIV of GATS, but not for the purposes of
246. For instance, treaty drafters may follow the example of the TPP, which already
includes such a provision in its annex on expropriation. See TPP, supra note 3, annex 9-
B, T 3(b) (footnote omitted).
247. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 406 ("In the U.S. model for exceptions in
FTAs, the general exception is not truly general. The scope element incorporates the
GATT/GATS exception by reference and applies it to selected chapters, including market
access for goods, technical barriers to trade, and cross-border services, among others. It
does not apply the exception to chapters on investment or intellectual property."
(footnote omitted)).
248. Note that the Unites States has currently in force FTAs with 20 countries.
Where such treaties incorporate by reference the GATT/GATS general exceptions, none
of these treaties makes general exceptions applicable to the investment chapter. See, e.g.,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES-PERU FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, U.S.-PERU, ch. 22, art. 22.1, Apr. 12, 2006, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/uploads/agreements/ftalperulasset-upload-file841_9542.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RRX5-G2VN] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
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Chapter 9 (Investments). 249 Thus, the general exceptions of the TPP do
not apply to the investment chapter and cannot be used as an
affirmative defense for breaches of investor protection obligations
under the TPP. This treaty practice should be reconsidered, as legal
scholars have suggested. 250 The state's regulatory power can be better
protected by ensuring that exceptions are available and applicable to
the investment chapters in FTAs. 25 1 For instance, treaties may follow
the example of the ChAFTA, which incorporates a separate article on
general exceptions directly into the investment chapter.252
The above changes would improve the substantive law and
provide a better balance between the state's right to regulate and the
investor protection rights. They do not, however, address how the
institutional and procedural mechanisms for resolution of investment
disputes can be improved. Since foreign investors do not entirely trust
the impartiality of the domestic courts of a host state, and state parties
do not trust private arbitrators' ability to make public policy
determinations, these two systems of dispute resolution should be
combined by supplementing investor-state arbitration with the
availability of limited court review.
An excellent example of how to procedurally structure such a
system comes from the international commercial arbitration of
antitrust claims. 253 There, private arbitral tribunals are allowed to
consider antitrust claims as part of international commercial dispute
resolution. In addition, domestic courts reserve the right to review the
resultant arbitral awards on the public policy ground in setting aside
and recognition and enforcement proceedings. 254 And, judging by the
lack of review on the merits and the very few challenges to such awards
in domestic courts, the system works very well.255 Further, there are
249. See TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.1.1-3.
250. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 406-07 (arguing for the expansion of the
scope of the general exception and providing a table with precedents from several TPP
countries-Brunei, Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam-
which already have FTAs with general exceptions applicable to investment chapters).
251. Id.
252. ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9, art 9.8.
253. See generally Korzun, supra note 241.
254. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
Article 24(2)(b)(ii), 1985 (with amendments as adopted in 2006); G.A. Res. 40/72, United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985) amended
by G.A. Res 61/33, U.N Doc. A/RES/61/33, at art. 34(2)(b)(ii) (Dec. 18, 2006). For
recognition and enforcement, see Article V(2)(b) of the 1958 United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention). United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, art. V(2)(b) [hereinafter New York
Convention].
255. See Korzun, supra note 241, at 927 (observing that "one would certainly expect
more challenges related to antitrust law than currently appear in the U.S. courts" and
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many benefits to it. For private parties, it provides all the advantages
of international commercial arbitration. For states and courts, it saves
on the social cost of litigating antitrust issues in addition to arbitrating
the commercial aspects of the parties' dispute. But, through their
courts, states also keep the power of review to ensure that
international arbitration is not used to evade mandatory domestic
antitrust law. For arbitrators, this process provides incentives-
enforced by the reputation mechanism-to ensure that antitrust law is
considered in arbitration and the resultant award is enforceable in
domestic courts.
A similar mechanism could be employed in ISDS. To achieve this,
the state would have to limit its consent to ISDS to the arbitration
rules of international commercial arbitration, most notably, the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 25 6 This would subject arbitrations
conducted under these rules to domestic court review on limited
grounds at the seat of arbitration or the place of enforcement. Such
court review would largely occur in the domestic courts of a country
other than the host state.25 7 These courts may not be as deferential to
the public policy determinations of the host state. Yet, the availability
of court review may serve as quality control and an additional incentive
for arbitral tribunals to ensure that their award is recognized and
enforced. Additionally, of course, different public policy objectives may
require different levels of deference on the side of reviewing court. For
instance, a higher level of deference might be granted to host state
that "[disputing parties] appear to be willing to comply with antitrust-related arbitral
awards, without using a second chance to fight such awards in a setting aside or
enforcement proceeding").
256. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 18. Most IIAs already include the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as a set of procedural rules available for conducting
investor-state arbitration. Court review in setting aside or enforcement proceedings is
also available for arbitrations under any other rules of international commercial
arbitration, as well as the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. And so, this proposal would
not necessarily require conclusion or revision of investment protection treaties to allow
for application of such rules. However, the choice of procedural rules to conduct investor-
state arbitration is currently left to a foreign investor that might prefer to submit its
claim to arbitration under the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Convention, supra note 18.
Under the ICSID Convention, the review of arbitral awards is limited to the annulment
procedure under Article 52 of the Convention. Id., art. 52. The ICSID Convention award
is also not subject to an appeal and is recognized as binding and enforced under the
Convention itself (Articles 53-54). The award is therefore outside of the scope of judicial
control available in the recognition and enforcement proceedings under the New York
Convention. New York Convention, supra note 254.
257. In some instances, host states may be able to submit their setting aside
application in their own domestic courts. For instance, having lost a NAFTA investor-
state arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules with the seat in Toronto,
Ontario, Canada, the country filed for setting aside at the Federal Court of Canada. See
William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and
Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04,
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Mar. 17, 2015) (addressing arbitral awards).
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measures seeking to protect moral values, in contrast to those
measures adopted to protect public health.
For investment treaty arbitrations under the ICSID Convention,
state parties could expand the grounds for annulment under Article 52
to include public policy.258 Until such amendments are introduced into
the ICSID Convention, the states wishing to have a second bite at the
apple to ensure that their public policy concerns are addressed in
arbitration, would have to rely on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
The system could also be enforced through reputation mechanisms,
which are inherently more powerful in investor-state arbitration than
in international commercial arbitration because of the growing
transparency of ISDS and the more closely knit family of arbitrators
deciding investor-state cases.259
Finally, the proposed system could also make use of the
mechanism of joint party determinations, as adopted by ChAFTA. In
particular, Article 9.11.4 of ChAFTA provides that "[m]easures of a
Party that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare
objectives of public health, safety, the environment, public morals or
public order shall not be the subject of a claim under this Section." 260
This is a newer mechanism for affording a state regulatory space in the
investor protection regime. 261 The ChAFTA mechanism has a number
of distinct features. First, the exception in ChAFTA is incorporated into
an article on consultations, which are a prerequisite for submitting a
claim to arbitration under the treaty. 262 Second, the exception
supplements the general exceptions article already contained in the
same investment chapter of ChAFTA, making general exceptions
directly applicable to investments. 263 Consequently, ChAFTA has
successfully addressed a long-expressed concern that general
exceptions cannot be used by a defending state in an investment
arbitration, as most FTAs do not make general exceptions applicable
to their investment chapters.
258. ICSID Convention, supra note 18, art. 52.
259. See, e.g., EBERHARDT ET AL., supra note 69, at 38-41 (identifying "a group of 15
arbitrators that can be considered the movers and shakers of international investment
arbitration," and presenting data on these 15 elite arbitrators, who together decided on
"55% (247 cases) out of 450 investment-treaty disputes known today, 64% (79 cases) out
of 123 treaty disputes of at least $100 million, 75% (12 cases) out of 16 treaty dispute of
at least $4 billion").
260. ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.11.4.
261. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Richard Braddock, Protecting Public Welfare
Regulation Through Joint Treaty Party Control: A ChAFTA Innovation, Columbia FDI
Perspectives, No. 176 (2016) (arguing that "[t]his ChAFTA mechanism represents a new
step in a broader trend of states seeking to recalibrate the balance between investor
protection and state sovereignty, and between the interpretative power of arbitral
tribunals and treaty parties").
262. ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.12.2.
263. Id. art. 9.8.
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Third, the exception in Article 9.11.4 also contains a number of
permissible public welfare objectives. This makes it more likely that a
government measure would benefit from the exception on one basis or
another. Most unusually, the exception is not only pronounced in the
treaty, but is also followed by a procedure that may be invoked by a
responding state claiming the exception. 264 In particular, the state may
submit a so-called public welfare notice to a foreign investor and a non-
disputing party "specifying the basis for its proposition" that a disputed
measure falls within the scope of Article 9.11.265 The notice then leads
to a consultation between the host state and the non-disputing party,
which triggers an automatic suspension of dispute resolution under the
treaty for a period of ninety days. 266 The consultation allows the state
parties to make a decision as to whether a challenged measure is "of a
kind described in [Article 9.11.4]."267 The outcome of such
consultations is to be made available to the claimant in the case, as
well as to the general public. 268 Under Article 9.18.3, "[a] decision
between the respondent and the non-disputing Party that a measure
is of the kind described in Article 9.11.4 shall be binding on a tribunal
and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with
that decision."2 69 Furthermore, the host state may rely on the benefits
of Article 9.11.4 even if it chooses not to file the public welfare notice,
or, having filed it, fails to reach a decision with the non-disputing
state. 270
The above procedure provides an opportunity for state parties to
jointly interpret the treaty provisions, as applied to a particular
government measure.27 1 In doing so, it avoids reliance on self-judging
264. Id. art. 9.11.5-9.11.8.
265. Id. art. 9.11.5.
266. Id. art. 9.11.6.
267. Id. art. 9.11.6-9.11.8.
268. Id. art. 9.11.7.
269. Id. art. 9.18.3.
270. ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.11.8.
271. Other treaties contain similar provisions on joint determination by state
parties of issues material to further dispute resolution by arbitral tribunals. See, e.g.,
TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.4.8 (extending application of Article 9.8 (Expropriation and
Compensation) of the TPP to taxation measures). This is an exception to the general
exclusion of taxation measures from the application of the TPP agreement. As a
prerequisite for invoking Article 9.8 and submitting a claim with respect to a taxation
measure to ISDS, Article 29.4.8 requires that a foreign investor first submits to
"designated authorities" of the Parties the "issue of whether that taxation measure is not
an expropriation." Id. If such authorities do not agree to consider the issue, or accept it
for consideration but fail to agree that it is "not an expropriation," the investor may
proceed with submitting its claim to arbitration under Article 9.19 of the TPP. Id. See
also TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.4.4 (providing that "an issue. . . . as to whether any
inconsistency exists between this Agreement and the tax convention [between two or
more Parties] . . . . shall be referred to the designated authorities of the Parties in
question."; id. at art. 29.4.4 (providing that "[a] panel or tribunal [in an arbitration
initiated under Article 9.19] established to consider a dispute related to a taxation
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criteria that could be abused by a host state. 272 However, as Anthea
Roberts and Richard Braddock observe, foreign investors might be
critical of the ChAFTA public welfare procedure as "repoliticizing
investor-state disputes by leaving investors at the mercy of joint
decisions of the treaty parties."2 73
A similar mechanism could be used by countries in BITs and other
IIAs. This would allow a host state to regulate for the public benefit,
although within the scope of the exception to the state's investor
protection regime. Most importantly, the mechanism would allow a
defending state to invoke the assistance of a non-disputing party-
reminiscent of the requirement for a preliminary ruling from the
European Court of Justice to interpret the European Union law-
instead of requiring exclusive reliance on the arbitral tribunal for the
interpretation of treaty provisions. And, for disputes heading to
investor-state arbitration, such joint determinations could serve as a
screening mechanism to distinguish non-compensable regulation
subject to the treaty exception from other instances of regulation to be
reviewed and assessed in ISDS.
V. CONCLUSION
Investor-state arbitration-a unique dispute resolution method
whereby foreign investors bring claims against sovereign states for
breaches of investor protection obligations-has been hit with a wave
of criticism in recent years. The opponents of ISDS name the lack of
transparency, consistency, predictability, and overall legitimacy as the
major shortcomings of the modern system of ISDS. They therefore seek
to reform the ISDS regime or to replace it with a system of permanent
international investment courts.
Concerns over regulatory disputes may pose the biggest challenge
to ISDS. Regulatory disputes involve claims by foreign investors
challenging government measures adopted for legitimate public
welfare objectives. Such disputes interfere with a government's ability
to regulate, encroach on a state's sovereignty, and may have a chilling
effect on regulation worldwide. Thus, concerns over regulatory
disputes have become the primary focus of ISDS opponents in the
vigorous debate on the future of ISDS.
In response to this criticism, the international community has
already enhanced the transparency and legitimacy of the ISDS regime
measure shall accept as binding a determination of the designated authorities of the
Parties made under this paragraph").
272. See, e.g., Roberts & Braddock, supra note 261 (observing that "by requiring a
joint decision of the treaty parties, ChAFTA limits the ability of respondent states to
abuse the mechanism, which would be a more significant risk if the clause were self-
judging").
273. Id.
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by developing the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the
Mauritius Convention on Transparency, as well as by incorporating
provisions on qualifications, experience, ethics, and codes of conduct
for arbitrators into IIAs. States have also become more careful in their
treaty drafting, seeking to clarify their investor protection obligations
to reduce the potential for regulatory disputes.
A recent multilateral trade and investment treaty, the TPP, has
gone even farther: the TPP incorporates a tobacco carve-out that allows
a host state to unilaterally revoke its consent to ISDS on a case-by-case
basis with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure. But
this may not be optimal. The best answer to the concerns over
regulatory disputes may be not choosing arbitration over litigation, or
vice versa. Instead, it may be relying on a hybrid dispute resolution
system-an investor-state arbitration with the availability of limited
domestic court review-that would make it amenable to both private
interests and sovereign public policy considerations.
